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The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

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OLIVER CROMWELL AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS

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During the past quarter of a century there has been an evident revival of interest in the career of Oliver Cromwell and in the history of the Puritan Revolution in general. There has of course been no time since his death when scholars have ceased to be interested in the career of the Puritan leader. In his own time he was the subject of intense and violent controversy; denounced by some as an apostate and a tyrant, "the dissemblingest perjured villain in the world"; hailed by others as an almost divinely ordained leader to establish God's kingdom on this earth. And the echoes of that controversy run through the vast literature that has accumulated on the subject. Hardly a generation has passed since his death in which new biographies have not appeared; and if the language in most of these has been more temperate, the judgments have varied almost as widely as those of the men who witnessed his military triumphs and his rise to power. There is no longer anything of that feeling of wonder and awe at this seemingly miraculous achievement, which characterized some of the earlier books. But there is still deep and serious disagreement about his deeds and his motives, about the principles by which he was guided, the objectives which he sought to realize, the real nature of his government, and the permanent results of what he accomplished.

The great period of historical writing on the subject extended from the publication of Carlyle's three volumes of Cromwell's Letters and Speeches in 1845 to the beginning of the present century, when the work of Gardiner and Firth on the history of the Commonwealth and Protectorate was completed. The result of the work done in those years was the establishment of what has been called the "canonical" tradition concerning Cromwell and his achievement. In the eighteenth century he had few admirers. The Tories hated him as the principal regicide. The Whigs condemned him for the destruction of the parliamentary constitution. And even the descendants of the Puritans regarded him sadly as one who, corrupted by success, had betrayed the great cause to gratify his ambition for power. The emphasis was solidly on what Hume called his "violent ambition and his enraged fanaticism"; and there were few writers—none who made any great impression on the reading public—who did not share that view.

The rehabilitation began with Carlyle.¹ His book awakened a new interest in Cromwell's career. It supplied readers with a substantial collection of Cromwell's own statements on many, but not on all the most important events of his life; speeches in which he explained, or more generally justified his actions and policies; letters in which he laid bare the most intimate secrets of his soul; and a few other documents which shed some light on some of the dark passages about which controversy raged. It was a flickering and uncertain light. Cromwell's statements, a blend of the practical and realistic with a species of mystic, apocalyptic utterances in which he excelled even among the Puritans, did not explain very much. But it was heightened, and the whole was borne along by the thundering dogmatism with which Carlyle proclaimed this new revelation.

As an explanation of Cromwell's career and of the revolution in which he took part, it was not a very satisfactory performance, even when judged by the standard of historical scholarship established by Hallam and other contemporaries. The notion that there could be two sides to the argument was, in Carlyle's mind, too preposterous to be given a moment's consideration. He assumed, as many before and after him had done, that Puritanism was self-evidently right; and he saw the struggle quite simply as one between the forces of good and evil. He dismissed as negligible the questions of legality, constitutionalism and dictatorship which have engaged the minds of other historians. These things could be left to the pedants, to the "owls and Godless men, who love the mephistic dusk and darkness and who are no judges of the actions of heroes." The purpose of Cromwell and his associates, as he saw it, was to make God's own law prevail upon this earth; and no doubt ever crossed his mind that theirs was the only possible interpretation of that law. Even within the narrow limits to which he confined himself his work was fragmentary, his facts were often distorted, and on most of the important passages in Cromwell's life—his share in bringing Charles I to trial, the destruction of the old constitution, and his relations with the parliaments of the Protectorate—he failed to give any adequate explanation of his hero's actions and motives.²

¹ *The Letters and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell; with elucidations by Thomas Carlyle* (London: 1845). 3rd ed. edited by S. C. Lomas, with an introduction by C. H. Firth. (3 vols. London: 1904).

² *Ibid.* I., Introduction; I., XXXVII.

Yet the book achieved an immediate, almost a spectacular success. It appeared at a moment when, for various reasons, the mind of the reading public was psychologically attuned to receive it. England was in the throes of a political and social ferment beyond anything known since the opening years of the French Revolution. The first Reform Bill had only recently been passed after a struggle which for a time had threatened to plunge the country into revolution and civil war. The echoes of the Chartist agitation, similar in so many ways to the Leveller movement which Cromwell had suppressed, had not yet died away. Europe was in the grip of the revolutionary movement that was to culminate in the disorders of 1848 and the flight to England of many of the defenders of the old order. The Young Ireland Movement, its revolutionary possibilities enhanced by the worst famine in modern history, was in full stride, threatening the dissolution of the union upon which, as most public men believed, the safety of the kingdom depended. On every side the foundations of the existing order appeared to be in jeopardy. And on a different level, religious controversy had been reawakened in an acute form by the differences between the Tractarians and the Evangelicals, a controversy which revived memories of that between the Arminians and the Puritans.

It was to a public bewildered and perplexed by all these things that Carlyle presented his portrait of Cromwell, the great soul who had risen above the petty and the mundane, fearlessly disposing of kings and parliaments, and driving against all opposition to his appointed objective, the establishment of truth, order and justice. His hope—at least it is commonly alleged that he entertained such a hope—that some one among his contemporaries would be inspired by his work to follow Cromwell's example, put an end to "the talking apparatus at Westminster," and solve these problems as Cromwell had solved his, was not to be realized. That was altogether unlikely in a community where men believed, not without reason, that the parliamentary constitution, as it was then evolving in England and being extended to overseas colonies, was one of the great achievements in the art of government. But if there were few who had any desire to see Cromwell's methods emulated, there were many who saw in this new Cromwell the champion of all that they valued, the true defender of parliamentary institutions, the protector of the humble and the oppressed, the advocate of religious and civil liberty, even, strange as it may seem, a pioneer of democratic

government. The view of Cromwell accepted by most earlier writers was completely reversed. The legend of the gloomy fanatic and the ambitious adventurer disappeared. Out of Carlyle's romantic and highly coloured portrait of the superman came the new legend of Cromwell the liberal, soon to be grouped by Gardiner with William III, Chatham and Washington, and to be given his place in the select company of England's great statesmen.

Carlyle had created a legend, one of the strongest and most enduring legends in English historiography. He had not contributed greatly to a balanced, judicious interpretation of the period, nor had he added much to the body of tested facts upon which a sober judgment of Cromwell's career could be based. That was to be the work of the great scholars in the age that followed, Gardiner and Firth pre-eminent among them. This is not the place to attempt a critique of Gardiner's history,³ and it is possible only to suggest the immense influence which he has exercised on those who have come after him. His historical method has been criticised,⁴ and the doubtful character of some of his basic assumptions has been demonstrated. Professor Neale's brilliant work on the Elizabethan house of commons⁵ reveals a state of things very different from that assumed by Gardiner in his frequent, but always indefinite references to the "Elizabethan constitution". Few scholars would any longer accept the view, implicit in virtually the whole of Gardiner's narrative that the house of commons in its contest with the Stuart monarchy was simply endeavoring to preserve a form of government that was being violated by these newcomers from Scotland with their fantastic ideas of the rights of kingship. And the revolutionary struggle, which was to reach its height in Cromwell's career went deeper and wider than Gardiner's history would suggest. No doubt he knew a great deal about current economics and social changes, but he has virtually nothing to say of the effect of these on the struggle that he is recording. Like most historians of his time he confined himself almost exclu-

³ S. R. Gardiner. *History of England, 1603 to 1642* (10 vols. London: 1887). *History of the Great Civil War* (4 vols. London: 1893). *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate* (4 vols. London: 1903).

⁴ R. G. Usher. *The Historical Method of Samuel Rawson Gardiner*. Washington University Studies (St. Louis: 1915). Cf. also, W. B. Notestein. *Gardiner's History*. Report of the American Historical Association, 1916.

⁵ J. E. Neale. *The Elizabethan House of Commons* (London: 1949). *Elizabeth and her Parliaments* (London: 1953).

sively to political and constitutional issues and to the religious and ecclesiastical questions that were inextricably mingled with them at the time. But within these limits his history is the most exact and detailed account that has been written of this, or of any comparable period of English history.

It is of course not free from the normal preconceptions of the Victorian liberal. For all his great knowledge Gardiner was no more immune than was any other historian from the intellectual environment in which he lived and worked. His sympathy with Puritanism is evident throughout; and if a hero were to be selected that honour would almost certainly go to Cromwell, with Pym a close second choice. But his sympathy, unlike that of Carlyle, was controlled by complete integrity, by a tolerance that embraced all, and by a knowledge, not only of the facts, but of the mind and spirit of men in the seventeenth century to which few historians could lay claim. His history has been described as a monument to the non-conformist conscience.⁶ It is more than that. It is a monument to Victorian liberalism in the more general sense of that term—a full and accurate chronicle of affairs in the seventeenth century, but one which reflected on every page the ideas of the prosperous, middle-class community that was building Britain's wealth and power under the great queen. The element of revolution was hardly perceptible. That was no part of the creed of Victorian liberals. The idea of continuity was emphasized throughout. Pym took his place with the framers of Magna Carta; and Cromwell became, not the almost super-human, symbolic figure of Carlyle's imagination, but the heir to his country's past glories, the statesman attempting unsuccessfully to restore the shattered fabric of the undefined Elizabethan constitution.

When Gardiner died in 1902 he had completed eighteen volumes of his history and had brought the record to within two years of Cromwell's death. His work was finished by his greatest disciple C. H. Firth, in two volumes on the Last Years of the Protectorate;⁷ and the material was available for what contemporaries regarded as the final judgment on Cromwell's character and career. It was delivered in the three classical biographies by Gardiner, Firth, and Morley. All three spoke with the voice

⁶ G. M. Young. *Charles I. and Cromwell* (London: 1935). This is one of the best of the shorter studies that have appeared in recent years.

⁷ C. H. Firth. *The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656 to 1658* (2 vols. London: 1909).

of Victorian liberalism; but there were some significant differences. Carlyle's influence remained. His interpretation of the Protector's career and policy was rejected; but his estimate of his character was, in Firth's judgment, substantially correct. The hero was scaled down to more human proportions. The emphasis was placed on the normal; and he was fitted, not without some difficulty into the continuous story of English constitutional development.

Gardiner's judgment was the most uncompromising. In his pronounced tendency towards moral judgments he was nearer to Carlyle than the other two; and as between Charles I and Cromwell his narrative leaves no doubt on which side the verdict lay. He recognized, with an evident undertone of regret that in the years of his power the Protector had moved away from the ideals of his earlier life. "Puritanism," he says, "still had a hold on his heart, but for all that it was the material, the mundane aspect of politics which had gained the upper hand." Yet his place in the annals of his people was beyond question. "He was in the world of action what Shakespeare was in the world of thought, the greatest, because the most typical Englishman of all time."⁸ The modern reader puzzling over Cromwell's confident assertions that his victories were manifest proof of the intervention of Divine Providence, and that his government in all its varied forms bore the unmistakeable impress of God's blessing, might doubt whether these were the utterances of so typical an Englishman. He might also doubt whether being typical is the most certain grounds on which to base so large a claim.

On that ground Morley, a man of affairs and a historian of proven ability, was more sceptical. Like his friend and fellow historian Lord Acton, he was not convinced by the argument, developed with all of Cromwell's religious fervour and with the soaring eloquence of Milton's prose, that success demonstrated the righteousness of the cause. That came dangerously close to laying a religious, or a pseudo-religious ground for the simple argument that might is right. The question assumes its maximum importance in connection with the decision to bring Charles I to trial; and it is examined by Cromwell in his own troubled and perplexed manner in a letter to Colonel Hammond in Novem-

⁸ S. R. Gardiner. *Cromwell's Place in History* (London: 1897), p. 115. This passage is curiously misquoted by W. C. Abbott in a work referred to below. His reading is, "In the world of action, what Shakespeare was in the world of art, the greatest and most powerful Englishman of all time." *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, IV, 895.

ber, 1648.⁹ The letter—it is too long to be quoted here—is in substance a consideration of the validity of “this principle that it is lawful for the lesser part, if in the right, to force the numerical majority.” It is one of the fullest and most emphatic statements of Cromwell’s belief in the direct guidance of Providence in all that he did; and what he did was of course done by and with the army in which he was already supreme. It was obvious that if the king were to be placed on trial—and trial almost certainly meant execution—it would first be necessary to dispose of the parliamentary majority which was opposed to any such course; and only the army could perform that operation. To the more forthright minds among the soldiers the problem presented no difficulty. For Cromwell, who had spent his public life in the service of parliament, the case was not so simple. Some moral principle there must be, something transcending the bounds of human law, to justify this reversal. He did not state the principle in so many words. But he reviewed the evidence in his own peculiar fashion. He pointed to the unbroken chain of “Providences,” to the appearance of “our most great God in the midst of this poor army,” and to the almost universal inclination of “God’s people, now called Saints,” towards this course. And in the midst of the laboured argument he asked the significant question, “Whether this army be not a lawful power called by God to oppose and fight against the king on some stated grounds, and being in power to such ends, may not oppose one name of authority for those ends as well as another, the outward authority that called them not making the quarrel lawful, but it being so in itself”?

That was the central question in the Puritan Revolution. Upon the answer given to it would depend the whole future of the movement, and with it the destinies of the English people for an unpredictable period of time. Hitherto the revolution had been directed towards the attainment of two objectives: the transfer of sovereign power in the state from the crown to the house of commons, and the replacement of the Protestant Episcopal Church established in the reign of Elizabeth by one which in doctrine, discipline and government accorded with the ideals of the Puritan party, but which, to judge by the results so far achieved, made little appeal to the mass of the nation. Now the question had assumed a more formidable character. It was not simply a matter of whether Charles I should be brought to trial.

⁹ Carlyle. *Op. Cit.* Ed., Lomas; I., 393 ff.

It was a question of whether the army, flushed with victory, and "counting its impulses as the revelations of the will of God,"—the phrase is Gardiner's—would take control of the situation, set aside the existing civil authorities, and proceed in its own fashion to establish a regime in church and state on principles to be determined by its leaders.

Cromwell was fully aware of the implications. He did not immediately answer his question; but his action at this time, and the record of his later life can leave little doubt that in his mind the answer was in the affirmative. A few weeks later, in a pamphlet written to justify what had been done, Milton wrote that "the king has been brought to the trial of justice, which is the sword of God, superior to all mortal things, in whose hands soever by apparent signs His testified will is to place it."¹⁰

There can be no reasonable doubt that Cromwell agreed with that judgment; but he was never capable of that kind of direct statement. His intellectual processes were slower, more devious, more indirect. He was here confronted with the greatest decision of his life, and the soul-searching debate wavered and wandered from one point to another. But it was conducted, as Gardiner declares, "in the spirit of one who argues because he has made up his mind, not in that of one who is resolved to follow the argument whithersoever it may lead him."¹¹ The decision had been taken, and Cromwell never again adverted to it. On a later occasion he was to upbraid his fellow officers for having made him "their very drudge," and for having compelled him to a whole series of actions against his own judgment. But the instances cited did not include the decision of 1648. He was no doubt anxious for compromise, but there were things that were above compromise. His action on this occasion, and indeed his actions through the remainder of his life demonstrate the truth of Gardiner's final judgment, that "he cared more for the thing to be done than for the way in which it was done."

It would be difficult to state in more precise terms the simple truth that in Cromwell's code the end justified the means. He enveloped it in a cloud of mystic language, and no doubt he was convinced of the truth of what he wrote. But the conclusion is

¹⁰ Milton; *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (1649). A convenient collection of Milton's Political Works is that edited by M. W. Wallace. (Oxford: 1925).

¹¹ Gardiner. *History of the Great Civil War*; vol. IV, 248-253. For a discussion of the problem by a more recent writer, Cf. Abbott, *op. cit.*, I, 695 ff.

inescapable. It was not the first occasion during the Puritan Revolution when men had acted on that principle, although the charge would have been, and probably still will be indignantly repudiated. The execution of the Earl of Strafford is a case in point. But it is a principle that one would scarcely have looked for in the greatest and most typical Englishman of all time. However, Gardiner wrote a great deal over a span of almost half a century, and some inconsistency—if this is an inconsistency—might reasonably be expected. It does not altogether square with the assumption of Cromwell's immense moral superiority over his opponents; but it is in accord with the character given him by Carlyle, and echoed in many later biographies, as one who is not to be judged by the standards which apply to ordinary mortals.

To Morley, whose habit of mind was more secular, and who for that reason probably had less sympathy with Cromwell's spiritual yearnings, the whole argument had a "thoroughly sophisticated flavour." He ventured no final judgment; but he left it with a doubt whether all this "had much actual weight in Oliver's mind," and with the open question, "what if this be the real Cromwell?" What if this represents "the literal working of his heart and temper?"¹² On that question the debate has gone on for three hundred years, and it is likely to continue.

The liberal writers of the nineteenth century put the emphasis pretty solidly on the more progressive and enlightened features of Cromwell's government. They were less familiar with the reality of dictatorship than their successors in our own time, and the term rarely occurs. It is not to be found even in Carlyle, whose work was in fact a hymn of praise to that form of government. With more abundant examples close to hand the historians of the past generation have been less shy of the term, and more disposed to draw comparisons between Cromwell and some of the modern representatives of the species. One of the last of the Victorian liberals, a scholar who has proclaimed himself a "natural Cromwellian," has indeed made the direct comparison with Hitler; and although he finds little that the two men had in common, he cites some characteristic statements from both, which indicate modes of thought not wholly dissimilar.¹³ A good deal of ingenuity has been shown, especially by continental

¹² John Morley. *Oliver Cromwell* (London: 1913), 280-281.

¹³ Ernest Barker. *Oliver Cromwell and the English People* (Cambridge: 1937).

scholars, in seeking out parallels. The New Model army has been compared to the storm troopers. Cromwell's plan of a Protestant crusade finds its analogy in Hitler's design of a holy war against Bolshevist Russia; and the shadow of Mussolini falls heavily over the pages of an Italian biography, described by its authors—as so many before it have been—as the first impartial and realistic account of the Protector's career that has been written.¹⁴

Many of these books will soon be forgotten. They include some not very impressive essays in denigration and a number of romantic biographies, which have little interest, except insofar as they demonstrate the continuance of the rather cloudy atmosphere of hero worship in which Carlyle invested the whole subject. Some of them will not be forgotten; and if they produce no immediate change in the popular view of Cromwell and his achievement, at least they indicate that the debate has been resumed, and on a high level. Among most modern writers there is less sympathy for the religious ideals of Cromwell and the Puritans than was shown by Gardiner and most of his contemporaries. The emphasis has shifted from the slightly threadbare discussion of political and constitutional details to the larger field of economic and social development. The Puritan Revolution no longer appears quite so simply as a struggle of high-minded Victorian liberals born some centuries before their time, against the dread tyranny of Stuart kings and their sycophantic bishops and ministers. Cromwell and his fellow revolutionaries are set against a larger background; and some strange conclusions emerge. In one recent essay he appears as the protagonist of the under-privileged lesser gentry, condemned to penury under the old scheme of government, and determined to secure to themselves the remunerative offices of state, where alone the big rewards were to be had.¹⁵

There are of course some exceptions. In one of the finest of the new biographies¹⁶ John Buchan presents the Protector essentially as a "crusader"—a curious and interesting description by an author who has declared that "these Puritans were indifferent Christians," since it was from the Old Testament, rather than

¹⁴ Eucardio Momigliano. *Oliver Cromwell*, trans. L. E. M. Marshall (London: 1931).

¹⁵ H. R. Trevor-Roper. "The Gentry, 1540 to 1640," *Economic History Review Supplement* (Cambridge: 1952).

¹⁶ John Buchan. *Oliver Cromwell* (London: 1934).

from the New, that they derived their inspiration. He professes complete agreement with Gardiner's conclusions; and no doubt the character of Cromwell which emerges from his pages does in general accord with that delineated by the earlier writer. But there are significant differences, and on matters that go deeper than the personal character of the Protector. There is here no echo of the assumption that underlies much of Gardiner's history, that the house of commons, even in 1641, was merely attempting to restore the "Elizabethan constitution," which had been all but destroyed by the early Stuarts. He recognizes that the attempt of the house of commons to seize power, to dictate the choice of ministers to the crown, and to extend its authority over the national church, was in the simplest and most direct sense of the term, a revolutionary design; and he wholly rejects the idea that Pym and his party, or any of their successors before 1660, represented the mass of the English people. It would of course be possible to select from Gardiner's work—his eighteen volumes inevitably contain a good many inconsistencies—some passages which lend themselves to this interpretation. But it is not strictly in accord with the general tenor of the earlier tradition. The book would be less valuable than it is if it did not reflect the influence of new ideas and a new approach to the subject.

That new approach is more evident in some other recent books. It is strikingly illustrated in the title of M. P. Ashley's biography of Cromwell, the *Conservative Dictator*.¹⁷ Ashley had already written a valuable monograph on the *Commercial and Financial Policy of the Protectorate*;¹⁸ and the influence of this new interest in the economic problems of the period is evident in his more ambitious work. He recognizes Cromwell as the first of the European dictators; a unique dictator, with little in common with the more finished products of our own time, but still a dictator. The emphasis is on the conservative features of his government, on his determined and successful efforts to prevent the political revolution which had brought him into power from degenerating into a wide-spread social revolution, which would alter the whole fabric of national life.

Cromwell and his fellow officers, and with them a good many

¹⁷ M. P. Ashley. *Oliver Cromwell, The Conservative Dictator* (London: 1937).

¹⁸ M. P. Ashley. *Financial and Commercial Policy under the Protectorate* (Oxford: 1934).

of "God's poor people, now called Saints," who had been "blessed by Providence with defense and more," were not wholly indifferent to the material rewards that were their due. They had been willing, as Gardiner observes, to make use of such groups as the Levellers in the crisis of 1648, since these were the men most resolutely opposed to the continuance of the monarchy. But he had no liking for their politics, and even less for their unorthodox ideas on the rights of property; and when he assumed power Cromwell quickly put an end to their activities, and by methods upon which Strafford himself could hardly have improved. By so doing he preserved virtually intact the old social order within which the distinctive institutions of English government had evolved in past centuries. And the preservation of that order—"a nobleman, a gentleman, a yeoman"—was not the least of the factors which contributed to the peaceful restoration, not alone of the king, but of the houses of parliament, the common law, the traditional system of local government, and the long established political and social predominance of the landed classes. It was a result which Cromwell would hardly have desired; but it may well be his most notable contribution to English national life.

One of these recent books is more than a biography or a monograph on some particular aspect of the history of the period. The four volumes of the *Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, edited by the late Professor W. C. Abbott, may well be regarded as a landmark in Cromwellian studies.¹⁹ It is at once the most complete collection of Cromwell's own statements that has been, or is likely to be published, and the fullest and most detailed biography that has been written. It is also the first work of the kind which departs from the established tradition of merely re-editing Carlyle and printing newly discovered material in an appendix or supplement. That is a salutary change. For the first time one may now read Cromwell's own statements—his letters and speeches, his orders, commissions and proclamations, everything in fact which can shed light on his personal reaction to the problems before him—without the accompaniment of Carlyle's wearisome interjections and admonitions. Abbott pays due tribute to his predecessor. But he leaves him alone with his hero and his theories; and he transfers the whole discussion to a more realistic plane.

¹⁹ *The Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell*, edited by W. C. Abbott, with the assistance of Catherine D. Crane (4 vols. Harvard University Press: 1937-1947).

In an earlier essay, revised and reprinted as the final chapter of this book, Professor Abbott has examined the many interpretations of Cromwell's career that have succeeded one another during the past three centuries. All of them have in varying degrees reflected the intellectual outlook of the age in which they were produced. The new books, Abbott's own work included, conform to the pattern. The idea of military dictatorship has never been wholly dissociated from Cromwell's government. During his lifetime he was compared to Caesar and Augustus; and while he repudiated the comparison, he appointed the poet who made it to a remunerative post in his government. A closer acquaintanceship with the species has led the writers of our own time to look more critically at what actually happened in the 1650s; and Abbott's four massive volumes are the most minutely detailed record of those events that has been written, not excepting even the work of Gardiner and Firth.

The record is the more impressive, since it is based so largely on Cromwell's own statements. The strictures of his opponents are disregarded, as are also the eulogies of such men as Milton, who were eager to justify any government that seemed likely to establish the rule of the self-constituted elite of virtue, in which they saw the essence of true liberty. It is in the main from Cromwell himself that the evidence comes; and Abbott's conclusion is stated plainly. It is impossible, he says to read "Cromwell's many letters, orders, commissions, warrants, declarations and proclamations without perceiving that the peace he established was the peace of the sword; that it was no love or admiration of the Protector, nor even pride in his accomplishments, but fear of the army and its general which maintained this uneasy quiet." And he allows himself the mild amusement of reflecting on "what would have been the immediate reaction of even some of his greatest panegyrists to the fact of his dictatorship, had they been privileged to live under it."

What is revealed here is an unusually efficient system of government. Until his health failed in the last year of his life it was directed in person by Cromwell; and the major decisions in foreign and domestic policy were his decisions. It was conducted in detail by officials whose fortunes were bound up with the new order, and who very soon adopted an attitude towards the practical problems of government indistinguishable from that of other groups in similar situations before and after the revolution. Within the limits imposed on them by the peculiar conditions of

their tenure they did their work remarkably well. They collected and disposed of the largest revenue which any English government had ever possessed, undeterred by the futile protests of the periodic assemblies, whose members continued to adhere to the ideas of the old house of commons. They maintained order in a community which for fifteen years or more had been racked by war and revolution; and they probably did something to promote the material prosperity of the country, although there is reason to believe that Cromwell's war with Spain had a deleterious effect on foreign trade, and that it added greatly to the general unpopularity of the regime. They established a system of espionage which kept the government informed of dangerous movements among its many opponents; and they silenced their critics by methods which, in point of efficiency if not of legality, were a marked improvement on those of the old Star Chamber. In the neighbouring countries, which had been brought into an enforced union with England, their rule was if anything, more autocratic. The record of the so-called "settlement" in Ireland is one which even the greatest of Cromwell's admirers can scarcely regard with much satisfaction.

The distinctive achievement of Cromwell's government, and that which has most generally attracted the attention of liberal writers, was the establishment of a limited system of religious toleration. In the letter it was restricted to the larger and more orderly Puritan sects. In practice it may have been more extensive, although there can be no definitive answer to that question until the records of the Major-Generals and the various commissions set up by the Protector to administer ecclesiastical affairs are more fully examined; and it is possible that such records no longer exist. There were the usual disabilities on those whose religious beliefs made them a "danger to the state"; and persecution, although less violent than in earlier periods, was never disavowed. What was unique was the absence of any prescribed doctrine. Cromwell was too much of a conservative to adopt the ideas of men like Milton and Roger Williams on the separation of church and state. But he refused to prescribe a uniform doctrine, and he successfully prevented the parliaments of these years from doing so. For Cromwell, as for many of those associated with him, this was the supreme liberty for which they had fought; and when it was imperilled by the intolerance of the elected members, he silenced them without delay. Against a government possessed of independent revenue and of over-

whelming military force, the tactics which had served the house of commons in its contest with the Stuart kings were of no avail.

The elected legislature, somewhat euphemistically described as "the people assembled in Parliament," had little real influence on the course of affairs. Nor is it apparent that the Council, composed entirely of Cromwell's nominees, had much more. The government was in essence a system of personal dictatorship, conducted through a highly organized bureaucracy, supported by irresistible armed force, which could be and was used for civil as well as for military operations. Cromwell no doubt desired that it should be otherwise. There is no reason to question the sincerity of his admonition against the use of force, or to doubt that he spoke his honest conviction when he warned the Levellers in 1647 that "what you must look to in the establishment of a government is the affection of the people."

But he was a realist, and his experience during and after the civil war was burned deeply into his mind. He had learned, as many others had done, that a sovereign parliament, indissoluble except at its own pleasure, and unchecked, either by an independent executive, or by acknowledged responsibility to the electorate, could be as great a danger to freedom as the most absolute of monarchs; and when he had freed himself from the last remnant of the old parliament, he had no intention of putting in its place another assembly possessed of similar powers. The time might come when change would be possible. But in the meantime—and there was no certainty how long the interim would last—good government was more important than self-government. And good government meant, *inter alia*, government by good men. Cromwell's own definition of the term was not unduly restrictive. It was certainly more generous than that of most of his Puritan contemporaries. But the required "moral integrity" came almost necessarily to be equated with willingness to support his government. In the last analysis the decision on who were the good men rested with him and his military supporters; and they had the will and the means to enforce their decision.

That was a logical consequence of the ideas on which the regime was based. It may be, as Cromwell's apologists assert, that he was a man of compromise, with an instinctive preference for old and established ways. But "this principle that it is lawful for the lesser part, if in the right, to force the numerical majority," carried implications which he could not escape. They were stated in very simple form by Milton in a pamphlet to

which reference has already been made. "If all human power to execute—not accidentally but intendedly—the wrath of God upon evil doers without exception be of God, then that power so executing the intent of God, whether ordinary, or if that fail, extraordinary, is lawful, and is not to be resisted." The argument was used in defense of the so-called Commonwealth in 1649. It was no less applicable to the governments over which Cromwell presided more directly; and there is a great deal in Cromwell's own letters and speeches which points to the same conclusion. He was not given to theorising; but it is impossible to read these statements without being convinced of his unwavering belief that Providence was guiding his steps, and that his government, whatever its form, was in the simplest and most direct way, blessed and ordained by God. Historians have perhaps concerned themselves too exclusively with the theory of the divine right of kings. There is material in these works of Cromwell, Milton and others for an impressive treatise on another theory of divine right, the divine right of an armed minority, whose victory was in itself evidence of God's will that they should wield supreme power. Put into completed form that treatise would give added point to Lord Acton's comment on Cromwell's career, that "there is no more perilous or immoral habit of mind than the sanctification of success."

This was a unique episode in English history. It was a period of intense, almost feverish activity, inspired in the main by Cromwell himself. His belief that God had called him to some great mission in the world gave him an energy that few rulers have possessed, and the effects were felt in every sphere of the national life. That conviction was the driving force behind his militarism. The term has not generally been used in discussion of Cromwell's career; but there is no ruler in English history, and few in the history of any other country, to whose policies it can be more fittingly applied. "War," he wrote in 1648, "is good when led to it by our God; most evil when it comes from the lusts that are in our members." The wars in which Cromwell was engaged during a great part of his life, whether against enemies at home or abroad, plainly fell into the first category. And the maxim admitted of indefinite application. It inspired his grandiose design for a Protestant crusade in Europe and his equally chimerical plan for joining with the United Netherlands to wrest the Indies from Spain and Portugal. It has been fitted into the generally accepted view of Cromwell as a great imperial states-

man, "a raiser and defender of England's empire." But such a theory, promulgated or acted upon by any other ruler, would probably be described in less lenient terms.

The results of all this activity, except in Ireland and in the Carribean, were transitory, and they are difficult to appraise. The scholars who are the arbiters in such matters have placed Cromwell in the select company of England's great statesmen. But there is no agreement on what his statesmanship accomplished; and the results of his rule continue to be stated in rather vague and general terms. One thing seems certain. His success was limited almost exclusively to those fields in which, for the time at least, force could be the determining factor. In those areas of the nation's life where it could not be effective the record was less impressive.

The regime failed entirely to commend itself to the English people. Some of Cromwell's supporters believed that, had he accepted the title of king, the permanence of the Puritan state would have been ensured; and that belief is evidently shared by some modern historians.²⁰ But there is no reason to think that a change of title would have altered the situation. It was not the Protectorate, but the Puritan state itself and the ideology upon which it was based, that was rejected by the English people. It struck no roots. It failed even more conspicuously than did the Long Parliament, or the personal government of Charles I, to win for itself that "affection of the people," which Cromwell himself saw to be necessary. And when the one man who gave it its seeming strength was removed by death, the whole structure fell to pieces without the necessity of striking a blow against it. Within less than two years of Cromwell's death the elaborate constitutional arrangements with which his name is associated had disappeared; and England had returned to her traditional forms of government, and to a way of life, less exacting and perhaps less edifying than that imposed by the Puritans, but almost certainly more in accord with the habits and instincts of the average Englishman.

The period has always been, and will continue to be the subject of intensive study. Whole libraries have been written in admiration of the ideal which inspired this Puritan state, and of the great man who directed it. But no one, with the possible exception of Carlyle, has shown any desire to see the experiment repeated; and Carlyle will have no successors. There is no assur-

²⁰ W. S. Holdsworth. *A History of English Law* (London: 1924), VI, 156 ff.

ance that the judgments reached by the historians of our own time will be more definitive than those of their predecessors. On such a question as this no finality can be expected. Cromwell's career, as Morley observed, has in it something of the quality of "one of the stock arguments of old world drama." It lends itself to "an almost endless range of presentment and interpretation." The process will continue; but a good deal has been done, and is being done to clear away the mist of emotionalism that has always surrounded the subject. The "canonical tradition" remains. But new material is constantly being made available; new ideas are being brought to bear on the subject; and Cromwell's place in history may eventually be defined in terms rather different from those which seemed proper to an earlier generation.

On his death-bed Cromwell inquired anxiously whether a man could fall from grace. His spiritual adviser assured him that such a thing was impossible. "History," as a distinguished English scholar has recently written, "may not be quite so certain."

FRANCE AND GERMANY AGREE — ON THE PAST

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With the disastrous slaughter and destruction of World War II over, Europeans have come to realize, in increasing numbers, that the old prewar political system based on the independent sovereign national state and alliances is no longer possible. Some form of union or federation makes more sense in the light of the political and economic conditions of the postwar world. Such programs as the revised European Defense Community, and the Schumann Plan for the rationalizing of coal and steel production, indicate a trend that would not have been given serious consideration before World War II.

One of the most potent forces working in favor of the old system is nationalism. With such a large emotional content it is easy to arouse in the masses. Journalists and demagogues, historians and teachers have all played a role in perpetuating this divisive force. The schools have too often planted the seeds and nourished them and thus made easier the work of the journalist, demagogue and politician. This has involved the glorification of the nation's past, a minimizing of its weaknesses and blunders, blaming its misfortunes on others, etc. Such techniques perpetuate and re-enforce old hatreds and foster a readiness to blame neighboring countries for the failures of one's own. It likewise tends to exaggerate the degree of independence so-called sovereign nations have in times of crisis. In the twentieth century excessive nationalism, unrealistic though it be, has not lost its power in spite of two World Wars. Soon however, the history textbooks used in French and German schools will make a serious effort to eliminate errors as regards each others past; errors which have perpetuated old hatreds.

The story of this effort is older than might first appear likely. In November of 1935, a Commission of French and German scholars met for a week of conferences in Paris and discussed various aspects of Franco-German relations and history during the last century and a half upon which there was disagreement. During the discussion agreement was reached on many of the points in question, but there were certain reservations on both sides on fifteen of them. The positions agreed to and the recommendations suggested were published widely in France in 1937, but in Germany, with Hitler in power, objective historical truth

was not in vogue in the schools. It was only after World War II that a reedited German text was made known in Germany.

By August of 1950 French and German teachers of history expressed the desire to have a second conference in order to incorporate the findings of recent historical research and to drop points which, though discussed at length in 1935, seemed to have lost all interest by the end of World War II. As a result of this interest eight German professors of history, headed by Professor Ritter of the University Freiburg, came to Paris in May of 1951 and revised, with a group of French professors, headed by Professor Renouvin of the Sorbonne, the text of 1935 and even added to it. The meetings were resumed and completed in October of 1951 at Mainz.¹ On finishing their task the members of the Commission "had the satisfaction of observing that this time they had reached agreement without reservations, not out of any desire to reach agreement at any price, but as a common understanding of historical truth."

The results of these discussions, which we publish below in translation from the official French-German text,² should be of considerable interest to American teachers of modern European History and to writers of history textbooks. On reading the conclusions reached, one can hardly fail to be impressed by the helplessness of statesmen in 1914, and by the all too real interdependence of nations in spite of their vaunted national sovereignty. While the teachers of history agree now that no one nation can be blamed for the catastrophe of 1914, which no one of them wanted, they show, without explicitly saying so, that the system of European sovereign states which prevailed in 1914 when no country wanted a European conflict, was unable to solve the crisis peacefully. Resistance to European union or federation is still strong; old hatreds and old ways die hard. But the lessons of history are here to indicate how urgent it is to change a system which the growing interdependence of nations

¹ The German professors, headed by Professor Ritter, who participated in the sessions of 1951 were: G. Bonwetsch, G. Eckert, K. Erdman, Kaier, H. Krausneck, K. Mielcke, O. H. Muller, H. Rohr, Hertzfeld, Göhring, Schüddekopf.

The French professors, headed by Professor Renouvin, who participated in the sessions were: Ed. Bruley, G. Zeller J. Droz, J. B. Duroselle, J. Tigman, A. Alba, R. Mangin, J. M. d'Hoop, A. Aubert, H. M. Bonnet, Fouret.

² *Bulletin de la Société des professeurs d'histoire et de géographie de l'Enseignement public*, mars, 1952, pp. 5-38.

has made obsolete and which experience has proved such a failure.

Those who teach history have a great responsibility in the formations of each generation. They realize no doubt that while technology is revolutionizing at a terrifying pace the conditions under which men live, it is an enormous undertaking in free societies to enable a majority of the citizens to face up to the logical consequences—political, social and economic—of this revolution. The gap between the needed reorganization of international relations and support for these changes by free peoples seems insurmountable but must somehow be made. French and German historians have at least taken an important step in the right direction by their decision to teach the same interpretation of the great events in their past on both sides of the Rhine.

The Conclusions

1) The kings of France, prior to 1789, did not follow a policy of “natural frontiers” aimed especially at reaching the Rhine. The idea of “natural frontiers” was, before the French Revolution, held only by a few political theorists. The kings of France simply tried to extend their territory in all directions. This policy conformed to the practice of all the monarchs of all countries at this time. The idea of nationality did not yet play an important role in the policy of rulers.

2) Textbooks should indicate the existence, in the eighteenth century, of a movement of ideas in favor of the organization of peace (Leibniz, abbé of St. Pierre, Kant . . .).

3) French foreign policy during the Revolution was characterized by a sharp break with that of the preceding period. This policy, at first inspired by the desire to spread French revolutionary ideology abroad, resulted very quickly in territorial expansion. French political leaders turned toward the conquest of Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine and justified their action by the new theory of “natural frontiers”. Finally, Bonaparte stamped upon French policy, after 1795, the mark of his personal ambitions.

The French Revolution introduced into Europe a new principle, the right of self-determination of peoples (plebiscites) whatever may have been its application in practice.

4) It should be emphasized that there was a long period of peaceful relations between the French and German governments from 1815 to 1859. A sizeable part of the German bourgeoisie evidenced for the liberal ideas born of the French Revolution a

sympathy which manifested itself particularly at the time of the July Monarchy. But, at the same time, this bourgeoisie feared French territorial expansion. This latent anxiety was aggravated during the crises of 1840 and of 1848.

5) For the period following the French Revolution students should be shown the differences between the French and German concepts of nationality. Every smug allusion to an "historical mission" vested in any people should be stricken from the textbooks.

6) Alsace, a land of German language and culture during the Middle Ages and the Reformation period, retained, after 1648, its particularities of language and to a great extent even its culture; but it clearly indicated, as early as the French Revolution of 1789, its desire to belong to the French national community. a) In the teaching of history in Germany, students should be told the French as well as the German point of view; the protest of the deputies of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, confirmed by the long movement of protest, should be mentioned.

b) French textbooks should indicate the reasons why the Germans in 1871 considered it legitimate to annex Alsace-Lorraine, except the French-speaking part of Lorraine which was annexed, by their own admission, for strategic reasons.

7) A) *The Attitude of Napoleon III.*

(1) The policy of Napoleon III was ambiguous and is difficult to understand because it oscillated between quite different objectives. On the one hand, it was led, by the need to bolster French prestige, to favor national aspirations throughout Europe, to assure itself particularly of the friendship of the kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont by supporting its national policy, and also to establish good relations with Prussia. On the other hand, the Emperor feared that the complete unification of Germany and Italy would mean grave dangers for France. The result was a policy, destined in advance to fail, of supporting up to a certain point the unification policy in both countries, then of halting this support half-way.

(2) It has sometimes been held in Germany that the ultimate aim of the policy of Napoleon III was to extend the French frontier to the Rhine. This thesis is now considered erroneous even by German scholars. It is true that French diplomacy tried on several occasions up to 1866, to obtain from Berlin and Vienna the cession of German territories to France or the formation of a buffer state in the lands along the Rhine. This commitment

was to be made in return for the promise of French neutrality during an Austro-Prussian war. These attempts never constituted however more than a secondary aspect of the political thought of Napoleon. They represented less his own desires than the concern of French nationalists who wished to strengthen the eastern frontiers of the country in case there should be an increase of German power. They were sought much more energetically by some of his ministers than by Napoleon himself. For the Emperor was always convinced that by making such demands he ran the risk of arousing all of Germany against himself and even of uniting Prussia and Austria against France.

(3) Napoleon knowingly supported Austro-Prussian opposition by encouraging the power policy of Prussia whose military power he had, up to 1866, seriously underestimated and, finally, by favoring the conclusion of a military alliance between Prussia and Italy. He seems to have expected from an armed conflict between the two principal Germanic powers the establishment of an equilibrium which would have prevented the preponderance of a unified Germany over France.

(4) The decisive victory of Prussia on the battlefields in 1866 was considered in France, and not without reason, as the worst defeat of the policy of Napoleon III. His efforts to prevent at least the South German states from entering the North German Confederation and even his attempts to establish, if possible, an alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy are understandable from the point of view of the political interests of France. They also appeared to the emperor as indispensable to the strengthening of his shattered authority in the eyes of the French people. But naturally, they were considered in Germany by the partisans of the unification movement as an unjustified interference and as a danger.

The war of 1870-1871 stemmed from this tragic conflict of national interests. It poisoned for a long time the neighborly relations of the two countries and cannot be understood unless these national rivalries are taken into consideration.

B) Bismarck's Policy

The efforts of Bismarck to found a national German state corresponded to the policy that the Western European states had followed for centuries. He had, therefore, the right to consider the policy of Napoleon as regards both the question of annexing the South German states and that of territorial "compensations" as an obstacle to the vital interests of Germany. He

was determined to overcome this obstacle by resorting to war, if necessary—without, however, considering *a priori* this latter course as the only means of assuring the triumph of his national policy.

This policy may be summed up as follows:

1) In 1867, during the Luxemburg crisis, Bismarck resolutely rejected the idea, which military circles had suggested to him, of a preventive war with France, but he so acted that Napoleon's policy in this crisis would end in a serious failure. His initial intention was probably not to bring about the failure of the French plans for annexation, but, by his diplomatic methods, he awakened mistrust and irritation in French governmental circles.

2) He did nothing between 1867 and 1869 to quiet the growing feeling of hostility in Germany towards France; he even encouraged rather than opposed this tendency. His actions aggravated further in France the anxiety with which the imminent unification of all of Germany was viewed.

3) Bismarck calculated that the internal difficulties which the regime of Napoleon had to face at home would lead the French government to permit the completion of Germany unification peacefully. He had decided, however, in case this did not occur, to break French resistance by force.

8) A fair statement on the origins of the war of 1870 should insist on the fact that both sides helped to increase the existing tension:

a) Bismarck, by secretly encouraging the Hohenzollern candidacy for the throne of Spain in the hope of maneuvering Napoleon and bringing about a situation likely to result in the fall of the imperial regime. Perhaps he also had the intention of weakening France militarily, in case of war, by creating a front in the Pyrenees.

b) Napoleon and his cabinet, by pushing since July 6 their diplomatic and political counter-offensive, and especially by presenting king William with demands for guarantees which put them in a bad light before the rest of Europe, at a time when in the mind of Napoleon and of most of his ministers, war seemed more to be feared than to be desired.

c) Finally, Bismarck, by summarizing the Ems despatch in the way he did. No doubt there was no "falsification", but there was a conscious aggravation of it with the intention of inflicting a serious diplomatic defeat on France or of forcing her to declare war.

It should be recognized that the German people as well as the French people went off to war each sincerely convinced it had been provoked, each without knowing exactly the diplomatic circumstances which were only brought to light much later.

9) As regards Franco-German relations between 1871-1890 the members of the Commission agree:

a) that during this period Bismarck's purpose was to maintain the position the German Empire had attained and not to try and provoke a new conflict. There is no proof that Bismarck wanted war in 1875 or in 1887 in spite of the anxieties caused in France by certain German press campaigns.

b) that during the same period the statesmen responsible for French foreign policy constantly sought to maintain peace. The Boulangist agitation, which was likely to awaken German anxiety, involved only a portion of French public opinion. The attitude of General Boulanger, although he belonged to the Cabinet, was disavowed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President of the Republic. Moreover, the events of 1887-1889 show clearly the complete failure of the Boulangist movement.

It is therefore likewise desirable:

a) that statements that the German Empire wished "to impose its domination on all Europe," or dreamed of "dominating the world" disappear from certain French textbooks.

b) that German textbooks point out the resistance to the Boulangist movement that existed in France itself as well as the complete failure of this movement.

10) French textbooks often exaggerate the importance of the Pan-German movement. Like all active minorities the Pan-German group did, on different occasions, exercise an influence on public opinion, but it had no decisive influence on governmental policy and was fought by the democratic parties (Social Democrats, Center).

German textbooks exaggerate the extent of the "idea of revenge" in France. This idea of revenge existed in a part of public opinion during the years which followed the war of 1870 but, in spite of the persistence of nationalism in certain intellectual circles, it declined constantly after 1890 and never played after that any notable role.

11) As regards the Franco-Russian alliance the members of the Commission agree that this alliance—like the Austro-German alliance—had a purely defensive character, but that the extent of the mutual commitment evolved in the following way:

1) the texts signed in 1891 and in 1892 made no allusion, even indirectly, either to the question of Alsace or the question of the Straits. Moreover, action under the Alliance between 1894 and 1896 shows that no connection was ever made between these two questions.

2) the letters exchanged between Delcassé and Mouravieff in August, 1899, enlarged the preceding commitments by giving as the purpose of the alliance "the maintenance of the equilibrium"; this new formula, not the text itself, but its spirit, could lead the French government to support Russian interests in the Balkan question and the Russian government to take into consideration the question Alsace-Lorraine.

12) The Commission expresses the wish that French and German textbooks, instead of limiting themselves to highlighting occasions when French-German antagonism manifested itself, should also point out the periods when the relations between the two countries were good, especially from 1878-1884 and from 1894-1898, and that they mention the attempts at cooperation on extra-European questions.

The Commission also expresses the wish that in the future more attention be devoted to the economic and cultural relations between the two countries.

13) The members of the Commission agree:

a) that the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 was in no way an alliance.

b) that this agreement was of such a character as to harm German economic interests in Morocco.

c) that the resignation of Delcassé, desired by Rouvier, the President of the Council, was requested by the German government which made a diplomatic démarche to this effect.

c) that German policy in the Moroccan question resorted to methods which inevitably awakened anxiety in France.

14) As regards the Moroccan crisis of 1911 the Commission agrees:

a) that the occupation of Fez by French troops constituted in the Moroccan question a new fact which could give rise to a German protest.

b) that the German reaction—sending the *Panther* to Agadir—at the moment diplomatic negotiations had just begun, took a form which French opinion considered threatening, although it was only, according to the expression of the Under Secretary of

State, Zimmermann, a pledge in order to obtain a greater compensation.

15) The Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 contained no general commitment for political collaboration. Although it did not give Russia any promise as regards the question of the Straits, it did give the Russian government, by settling Asiatic problems, a greater freedom of action in the Balkans.

The Anglo-Russian rapprochement was considered in Germany as the sign of a policy of encirclement aimed at the German Empire.

16) The French military law of 1913 (three years of service) was only drawn up by the French government in March 1913 in order to answer the proposed German military measure announced in the German press as early as January 1913. The debates on the law in the French Parliament were held, moreover, at the same time as those on the German law in the Reichstag. The German government took into consideration the French proposal in hastening the vote on its own law. Textbooks should take these facts into consideration.

17) As regards the military arrangements made by the principal states before 1914 the Commission agrees:

a) that the Anglo-French military and naval arrangements which were worked out by the general staffs from 1906 on never constituted an alliance or commitment binding the governments; this reservation was always explicitly stated in the documents of the period. The technical provisions agreed to were made solely to permit a rapid and efficient collaboration of the armed forces of the two countries in case the governments decided to act together. But the existence of these arrangements was of such a character as to constitute for the signatories a moral commitment which public opinion and the British Parliament remained free however to disavow.

The Russian and French general staffs had, on the other hand, frequent exchanges of views which resulted in the signing of protocols in which were indicated in detail the delays necessary for the concentration of military forces.

Finally, an Anglo-Russian naval convention was being worked out on June 1914; but there is no document to indicate that negotiations were continued in July 1914.

b) the arrangements between German and Italian general staffs had resulted in 1887 and in 1913 in the signing of military conventions, and in 1913 in the signing of a naval convention. A

naval convention was signed in 1913 between Austria-Hungary and Germany: military operations were made the object of common provisions which were not expressed in the form of a convention.

18) The documents do not permit attributing a premeditated desire for a European war on the part of any government or people in 1914. Distrust was at a peak and ruling circles were dominated by the idea that war was inevitable. Each one accused the other of aggressive intentions; each accepted the risk of a war and saw its only hope of security in the alliance system and the development of armament.

19) Certain circles of the German General Staff thought the chances of success for Germany were greater in 1914 than they would be in the succeeding years; but one cannot deduce from this that the policy of the German government was determined by these considerations.

b) The great majority of the French and German peoples did not want war, but in Germany, especially in military circles, there was a greater disposition than in France to accept the eventuality of a conflict.

This disposition stemmed from the place which the army held in German society; besides, Germany always felt threatened as a result of its geographic position in the center of Europe, particularly by the alliances between her possible adversaries.

c) The old opinion that Poincaré followed a policy leading to war is no longer accepted, even by German historians. However, the alliance system created in Europe a situation of such a character that Franco-Russian cooperation was felt by the Germans to be a direct danger.

20) The conflict of 1914 between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was the culmination of a long antagonism which had become manifest since the coming to power of Karageorgevitch in 1903. There was a conflict between the conception of the national state and the historic tradition of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian state. The latter felt threatened in its very existence while Serbia could not give up seeking its national ideal. As the problem of nationalities had not been solved by the government of Vienna within the framework of the Dual Monarchy it became a problem of European importance. Hence, the policy of localizing the war, followed at the beginning of the crisis in July by the governments of Vienna and Berlin, was destined to fail.

21) On the controversial question of the responsibility of the Serbian government in the preparation of the assassination at Sarajevo the Commission agrees that.

a) there is no doubt of the link between the murderers and the Pan-Serbian movement.

b) direct complicity of the Serbian government in the preparation of the assassination has not been proved although it seems that certain members of this government had knowledge of it.

22) The Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on militarily ill-prepared Serbia was disastrous politically. The government of Vienna had no clear view as to the solution it would bring to the problem after crushing Serbia. The brutal rejection of the Serbian reply—a rejection which aroused astonishment even in Berlin—placed the Central Powers in the wrong before Europe. By resorting to arms the Austro-Hungarian government wished to forestall any diplomatic intervention on the part of the great powers and thus made a peaceful solution of the European crisis extremely difficult.

23a) Russia believed herself obliged in July, 1914, both by tradition and interest, to support Serbia against Austria-Hungary.

b) Although Sazonof personally feared war he wished to avoid a renewal of the failures Russian policy had suffered in the Balkans in 1909 and 1913, especially since her freedom of decision was limited by internal difficulties in Russia.

c) The Russian government considered the partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary an indispensable means of pressuring the government of Vienna into modifying its policy. If Russia changed from a partial mobilization to a general mobilization with all the political and military dangers this implied, she did so essentially for technical military reasons. These were invoked by the General Staff and carried greater weight than political considerations.

24a) In July, 1914, the British government sincerely desired the maintenance of peace and, with this in view, multiplied its attempts to mediate.

b) Under no circumstances, however, did it wish to permit Germany to defeat France. Satisfied with the results of the agreements made with Russia in 1907 it wished to avoid reviving Anglo-Russian antagonism on a world-wide scale.

c) Sir Edward Grey did not warn Germany clearly enough and in ample time that England would take the side of France and

Russia in case of conflict because of hesitation in the British Cabinet and of its desire not to encourage, by taking prematurely an unequivocal position, an aggressive policy on the part of Russia.

d) Without the German violation of Belgian neutrality Sir Edward Grey would have found it difficult to persuade the British Cabinet and Parliament to intervene immediately in the war.

25) Although conversations on technical questions took place between the English and Belgian general staffs in connection with the first Moroccan crisis, it is beyond doubt that in the years before the war Belgium practiced a policy of strict neutrality.

26) French policy in 1914 was not determined by the desire for a war of revenge against Germany but by that of maintaining the Russian alliance which was considered an indispensable counterweight to German power. This pre-occupation led President Poincaré to promise, on July 23 during his visit to St. Petersburg, that the French government would invoke the treaty of alliance. This declaration meant, in the circumstances of the moment, that France would enter the war if Germany intervened with arms in an eventual Austro-Russian war.

b) The French government did not advise against Russia's partial mobilization against Austria-Hungary, but, on July 30, it recommended that Russia take no measure which might provoke a German reply. It is true that the Ambassador of France did not carry out completely the instructions of his government.

27) German policy did not aim to provoke a European war in 1914; it depended above all on obligations contracted with Austria-Hungary. To prevent the dissolution of Austria-Hungary which it considered dangerous, the Berlin government gave the government of Vienna assurances which amounted to a "blank check." The German government was dominated by the idea that it would be possible to localize a conflict with Serbia as in 1908-1909. However, it was prepared to run the risk of a European war in case of necessity. Consequently, it neglected to exercise in time a moderating influence on Austrian policy. It was only from July 28 on that Bethmann-Holweg took steps in this direction. But Moltke, convinced that a European war was inevitable, insisted, on July 30, as head of the German General Staff and for strictly military reasons, on hastening the order for general mobilization in Austria-Hungary.

The general mobilization of Russia, ordered July 30, necessarily obliged the German government to order mobilization. From July 31 on the attitude of Germany was determined, as was that of the other continental powers, by military considerations which gained the upper hand over political considerations. The decisions of the German government proceeded from the firm conviction that France could in no case remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war and that a war on two fronts could only be won if it began with a campaign through Belgium in order to encircle and crush the French army quickly.

These military considerations inevitably led everywhere to the issuing of orders for mobilization and, in Germany, in addition to this, to the hastening of the sending of ultimatums and to the delivery of declarations of war.

28) As regards the First World War the French and German text-books in current use are, in general, free of all propaganda about "war atrocities". German texts still contain errors about the "war of civilian participants" in Belgium and France. These result from a confusion of the Belgian "civilian guard" (*garde civile*) with the unauthorized formations of civilian participants. French textbooks should consider the conduct of German troops in Belgium and France objectively and equitably.

29) In order to judge equitably the work of Versailles, the extreme difficulties involved in making a satisfactory settlement after a conflict of such magnitude should be taken into consideration.

a) The statesmen of each country negotiated under the pressure of a public opinion keyed up to the highest pitch by the passions born of war.

b) The application of the right of self-determination of peoples as well as the establishment of a supra-national organization ran into great practical difficulties. The overlapping of nationalities in Eastern Europe and in the Danube basin in particular raised difficulties which inevitably provoked strong tensions.

c) Again, the fundamental divergence of aspirations between France and Germany constituted a particularly serious obstacle to a durable organization of peace. While France tried above all to strengthen her guarantees of security, the German people sought to conserve as much as possible of the material bases of their powers. This led them to oppose violently, from the very beginning, the terms of the treaty.

As regards the different terms of the Treaty of Versailles the Commission confined itself to studying the points which contributed most to embittering the relations between France and Germany.

30a) Article 231 of the Treaty was considered in Germany as a unilateral avowal of guilt, wrenched from her by constraint, and as such, it raised profound ill-will.

b) Article 231, in the minds of its authors, established the juridical responsibility of Germany for the damage caused by her armies. It did not imply an admission of moral guilt. This notion of moral guilt figured in the resolutions adopted by a Sub-Commission of the Versailles Conference but they were not retained in the peace treaty.

c) However, the general affirmation of German responsibility, stated in the preamble of the Allied Note of June 16, 1919, and the circumstances accompanying the delivery of the peace terms to the German delegation, reenforced in Germany the impression of moral condemnation.

The Allies could not agree on the amount to be exacted of Germany by way of reparations. The resistance and animosity of the German people against this part of the treaty were kept alive by the lack of precision concerning the reparations payment and the necessity of constantly resuming negotiations on this subject.

On the other hand, the repeated deceptions, due to the insufficiency of German payments, aroused in France likewise a great deal of bitterness, especially since France was expected to make big payments to the United States.

31) Of all the questions raised by the study of the Treaty of Versailles one of the most controversial was that of deciding whether the text of it corresponded to Wilson's Fourteen Points which had been accepted by the German government at the time of the armistice as the basis of the peace negotiations.

a) The peace proposals of Wilson, because of their general character, inevitably led to serious divergencies and the Allies could appeal to the interpretation of Colonel House which corresponded, in a general way, to their wishes. In particular, the application of the right of self-determination of peoples inevitably led to difficulties in all those regions in which people of diverse nationalities were mixed.

b) Likewise, the German people saw in the loss of all their colonies and of a part of the territories they had to yield, espe-

cially in the East, a violation of the Fourteen Points. (The cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France was clearly provided for in Wilson's Fourteen Points.)

c) The refusal to permit the joining of German Austria to the German Reich, already agreed to by the Austian Constituant Assembly, also appeared as a violation of the Fourteen Points.

d) It is beyond doubt that the inclusion of military pensions in the amount of the damages exacted by the Allies contradicted the original provisions of Wilson. But it was not France which originally asked for their inclusion.

e) If France opposed the joining of German Austria to the German Reich she did so for reasons of security and for fear of an excessive increase of German power.

32) It was the loss of lands in the East which was most deeply felt by the German people. The Commission agreed unanimously that the restoration of Poland flowed from the right of self-determination of peoples. In Germany, it was not always understood that the existence of a Polish State as well as the creation of a belt of buffer states in the East was above all an eventual protection against Bolshevistic Russia. Thus the Germans felt that the boundaries fixed for these new states were unjust and resented them very much.

33) French policy on the questions of the Rhineland and the demilitarization of Germany were determined by her preoccupation with assuring the security of France which, from the point of population and capacity for economic productivity, was inferior to Germany. This preoccupation was increased by the refusal of the United States and England to ratify the Pact of Guaranty which had been signed in 1919.

34) The League of Nations, at the time of its foundation, seemed capable of mitigating the sharpness of the antagonisms aroused since Versailles. But, from its inception, it suffered from the absence of Russia and the refusal of the United States to join it. Thereafter, the conquered saw in this organization a means for perpetuating the power relationships set up by the peace treaty.

35) German and French textbooks should point out that there are great differences in the evaluation of the reparation payments. These differences stem from the diversity of methods used for estimating them and the difficulties raised by the evaluation of payments in kind actually made: It seems impossible to reach agreement on precise figures, but it is certain that the sums

received by France were much lower than the cost of the damage actually suffered.

36) The occupation of the left bank of the Rhine was undertaken for reasons of French security. The separatist movement in the Rhineland was encouraged in the occupied zones by certain French civil and military authorities. The French government, which disavowed these authorities in 1918-1919, allowed events to take their course in 1923.

The occupation of the Ruhr was motivated by the desire of the French government to have a pledge that Germany would carry out the reparation payments. This occupation occurring four years after the end of the war, resulted inevitably in awakening German nationalism.

37) On the subject of disarmament textbooks should, in so far as they treat the question, indicate the state of minds in Germany and France. On the one hand, the clauses relative to disarmament engendered a feeling of insecurity in Germany, particularly noticeable along the frontier of Poland, and gave the German people the impression that it was the object of an unjust discriminatory measure. But, for its part, French public opinion was disquieted (a) by the influence which military circles retained in the German Republic, (b) by the existence of paramilitary organizations in Germany, (c) by Russo-German diplomatic conventions.

38) In the treatment of the Weimar Republic, German and French texts should take into consideration the following points of view:

The democracy established at Weimar was not a political system which the military defeat of 1918 and the collapse of monarchical authority alone imposed on the German people. The elections to the National Assembly at Weimar and its work on the Constitution prove that there existed from the beginning important democratic forces; however, the regime found itself in a state of permanent crisis from 1919-1923. This crisis, due to political and economic difficulties as well as to the burdens of foreign policy, reached its peak with the conflict over the Ruhr. These difficulties explain why the military and traditional forces played in the life of the young Republic a role of unexpected importance.

However, in 1920, a monarchist putsch showed itself hopeless, but the rapid increase of inflation, which no government could control before 1923, had a fatal influence. The economic ruin of

the middle class created a situation likely to lead large groups of the bourgeoisie to extreme political solutions. Only the return to economic stability, thanks to foreign loans, and the détente of 1924 in foreign policy made possible a strengthening of the Republic. This strengthening lasted until 1929.

No doubt the election of Von Hindenburg to the presidency of the Reich appeared as a symptom of a very serious strengthening of the Right; however, the Reichstag elections of 1928 showed that the majority in Germany belonged to parties relying on constitutional government: Social Democrats and moderate bourgeois parties (Center, Democratic party, German People's Party).

39a) In 1925 the consolidation of the Republican regime in Germany and the new tendencies of the parliamentary majority in France created conditions more favorable to a Franco-German rapprochement.

b) The policy of Briand and Streseman made possible very noticeable progress toward this idea of a Franco-German rapprochement thanks largely to the Locarno pact.

c) The policy of these two statesmen, if followed with perseverance, would have offered European states serious possibilities of rapprochement; but, on both sides, it was hindered by inevitable questions of internal policy which prevented it from achieving a complete success.

40) In order to understand the collapse of the Weimar Republic in the years of 1929-1932 it is indispensable to take into consideration the following points of view:

a) In the Weimar Republic the adoption of proportional representation weakened governmental authority by making the formation of a majority in the Reichstag difficult. The stability of ministries which depended on parliamentary coalitions was thus constantly threatened. To remedy this critical situation there was an increasing recourse to government by decree. This emptied the democratic regime of all substance.

b) The German people, in its impatience, blamed the delays in evacuating the Rhineland, the difficult progress of negotiations relative to reparations and the failure of the proposed customs union with Austria to the stubbornness of democratic governments. Even when the evacuation of the Rhineland was finally completed, reparations payments suspended and future equality of rights in the military domain granted in principle, no notice-

able change resulted because of the atmosphere of political tension which reigned in Germany during the years 1931-1932.

c) Finally, the world economic crisis had a decisive influence on Germany. Unemployment, which affected great numbers of workers (7,000,000), provoked an upsurge toward the extreme parties of right and left. Another important factor of this evolution was the bourgeois fear of Communism, the electoral success of which caused fear of a renewal of internal troubles. This anxiety incited influential circles of the Right (Hugenburg), big industry and high finance to support National Socialism in the hope that this movement would safeguard their power.

d) In this situation very important masses of the German people supported National Socialism although it never obtained an absolute majority as long as elections were free. These masses were misled by an outrageous propaganda which preached a most vivid distrust of what it called "the Weimar system" and a vicious hatred of the powers victorious in 1918. But they were also seduced by the hope of finding in Hitler the "procurator" who, raised up by the true will of the people, would conciliate the old internal antagonisms and build up the power of Germany on new foundations. As he avoided renewing his attempted coup d'état of 1923 and first became Chancellor in January, 1933, "legally," as head of a parliamentary coalition government, he succeeded in concealing his ultimate aims from public opinion. Most of those who voted for him expected him to establish an authoritarian regime and realized too late, or underestimated, the danger of his abusing this regime in order to establish an unlimited tyranny and to destroy the constitutional state. The bourgeois parties of the Right committed another error when they believed that by agreeing to participate in his Cabinet they could keep him in the ways of legality.

MITRE'S SAN MARTÍN

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The overthrow of the Old Régime in Europe brought about the destruction of the old order in Spanish America and with it a disorganization of society, the full extent of which has not always been understood by nineteenth century historians. But for the Latin American peoples their emancipation from Spain meant the beginning of their national life, and it is natural that Mitre, the great Argentine statesman, writer, and historian (1821-1906), whose book on the South American branch of the Spanish American struggle for independence is still a classic, saw in these revolutions an immensely satisfactory piece of history.¹ Nevertheless, the deeds and the destinies of the two outstanding heroes of that movement, such as Mitre himself describes them, show that even these two great men were instruments of anarchy rather than leaders of a new legitimate order. A brief look at the life and work of San Martín, who, as an Argentine, was closer to the heart of the Argentine Mitre than the Venezuelan Bolívar, proves that he, who did so much to overthrow the Spanish rule, had little to give with which to replace it, nor was he by instinct and intellect qualified to do so.

Born in a locality with an Indian name, in the interior of what we now call Argentina, he was brought to Spain when he was eight years of age and did not return to America until he was thirty-four. That was in the year 1812. He then remained in America until 1824, when he went back to Europe where he lived another twenty-five years, choosing first Belgium and then France for his residence. By his upbringing and experience he was, therefore, more of a Spaniard than an American, if indeed he was an American at all.²

¹ Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de San Martín y de la emancipación sudamericana*, 3 vols. (edición del diario "La Nación," Buenos Aires: 1950. "Based on San Martín's papers, now preserved in the Mitre Museum in Buenos Aires, it first appeared in 1888 and has not been surpassed for literary quality nor have subsequent biographers added much factual information to his account although they have challenged some of his interpretations." William H. Gray, "San Martiniana 1950," *Hispanic American Historical Review* XXXII (1952), p. 294. See this article for a guide to bibliography.

² Both his parents were Spaniards from the very heart of Spain; his father from Leon, his mother from Old Castil.

He had no roots in any fixed abode. He never revisited the site where he was born and lived the first years of his childhood; and during his twelve active years in America (the period which almost exclusively concerned Mitre), whenever he remained anywhere for any length of time, it was only for the purpose of preparing an expedition to go somewhere else. He traveled from Argentina to Chile, from Chile to Peru, and not long after arriving in Peru he was obliged to leave this continent forever.

Although we must believe his frequent protestations that he loved America as a whole, he did not display that attachment to any of the parts of the land for whose liberty he fought, that concrete and regional feeling of belonging, which we associate with a natural love of country. It is true that he developed a great fondness for the "virtuous city of Mendoza"³ in the Argentine province of Cuyo, whose governor he was from 1814 to 1817, and that there he created something like a home for himself and that this was the spot where he would have liked to settle down, if he could only have done so. But his exclusive purpose in organizing the province was to draw from it the forces that would permit him to make his expedition across the Andes into Chile.

It reveals the moroseness of the expatriate who finds no rest anywhere that he could say of Chile, after he had liberated it, "I do violence to myself dwelling in this country,"⁴ and that, when he ruled Peru under the name of Protector, he was disgusted by "the insalubrity of these infamous coasts."⁵ Nor was he liked by the peoples for whose liberty he fought. He was not popular in Argentina, the Peruvians took him for a foreigner, and on his return from Peru to Chile, he found that the people there loathed his name. Indeed, one of the factors that had permitted him to make his expedition to Peru was that the Chilenians wanted to get rid of him and his army, and gladly sent him on his way.

There is no doubt, then, that he was a rover, a wandering Spaniard, like the men of the Reconquest and of the Conquest, a very ancient Spanish type. And like those who won America for Spain, he a *Conquistador* in reverse, acted almost always independently of any established government and took no orders. Like them, he created his own army, that small army with which

³ Mitre, *op. cit.*, II, 41.

⁴ *Ibidem.*

⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, 397.

he crossed the Andes and liberated Chile and the coasts of Peru. His strategy, too, to overthrow the royalists in Peru with the help of Chile (and for this reason it was necessary to liberate Chile first of all) was conceived in the same realistic spirit as that of the leaders of the Conquest, who realized that they could not proceed nor even subsist without using the natives as allies and as sources of supply.

The idea of the liberation of Chile was a simple one which, nevertheless, seemed so mad to most people that he thought it wise for a long time not to reveal that he adopted it. To be sure, he was a secretive man; but no matter whether it was necessary to keep it secret or not: he was, as he well knew, the only one who could carry it out, since among all the ambitious or fickle or amateurish South American leaders of the time he, San Martín, was unique in this, that once he had committed himself to his idea, he never swerved. From it, all his actions followed "geometrically" (to use a word he was fond of).

It was a plan of action, based on his perfect insight into the exigencies of the American geography, and not merely an abstract concept. For he was a soldier, educated in the officer corps of the Spanish army which he joined when still in his teens, and essentially an uncultured person who could not even spell correctly. But he was no simple military man; he was capable of and even addicted to actions of a very complex nature. He excelled in carrying out an underground war by means of secret agents and spies and through the fomentation of rebellion in the royalist territory; and he well knew how to manipulate the governments in order to promote his plan.

His individual disposition had the artist's complexity. His nervous system revolted against the strain imposed upon it by his singleness of purpose. He was a chronic sufferer from neuralgic pains, he spat blood, vomited, he could not sleep without large quantities of morphine, and ever so often he thought he was dying. But he persisted and when, in the end, he understood that the resources at his command did not suffice to reach his goal, he made the almost superhuman sacrifice of withdrawing in order to leave the field to Bolívar. Certainly, this dedication to the idea was a Spanish trait.

Since he was not motivated by personal ambition, he could not be a Caudillo; and since he was not an educated man, his political thinking was somewhat vague and he was no statesman. He failed as governor of Peru. He was more successful in the organi-

zation of the province of Cuyo, where he established a paternal, though despotic régime. He was a fatherly figure. He liked to eat in the kitchen chatting with his Negro cook, for he had the democratic attitude of the Spanish patrician. But he could be an awe-inspiring father, as when he warned the Peruvian royalists: "Tremble, do not abuse my indulgence!"⁶ He was austere, he avoided public ostentation; he said at a dance given in his honor by Bolívar in Quayaquil: "I cannot endure this bustle,"⁷ words which, at the same time, give an idea of how he felt towards Bolívar. And we see him in his final exile: a father, spending the years in the company of his daughter.

This grave, silent soldier, homeless and partyless, had something enigmatic about him. He liked to surround himself with mystery. However, the one really tantalizing riddle of his life is why he, who had gone to Spain when he was an eight-year old child, returned to America when he was thirty-four, in order to dedicate himself to the cause of its independence.⁸ It is true that we know that in Spain he had been introduced into the Lodge founded by Miranda, which in America, under the name of Lautaro Lodge, played such a large part in the struggle for independence where it represented something like an underground government. Freemasonry must have been attractive to San Martín with his somewhat primitive partiality for secretiveness. But it is not clear why, how, and when he embraced the cause of independence.

Since he had the instincts of a *Conquistador*, it is safe to assume that it was above all this aspect of his nature, that called him to America. Latin American writers make much of the American or Creole element in him, that, according to them, predestined him to his role of American liberator.⁹ The possibility cannot be denied that the impressions of his childhood may have determined his life. The mysterious, secretive side of his character can be thus explained; for such reticence is not generally a Spanish feature. But his predilection for the Lodge and the large scope he gave it in his transactions in America, as well as his disregard of formal religion, prove that he was much affected

⁶ *Op. cit.*, II, 462.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, III, 337.

⁸ San Martín had three brothers and one sister, all older than he; none of them returned to America.

⁹ So Mitre and particularly Ricardo Rojas. See the latter's *San Martín, Knight of the Andes*, translated by Herschel Brickell and Carlos Videla, (Doubleday, Doran & Company, Garden City, N. Y. 1945).

by the romantic-liberal trends of that period.¹⁰ His revolutionary bent and his delight in the obscure were natural results of the romantic atmosphere of that age, whose influence hardly anyone then living could completely escape.

San Martín, so often sad and sick and weary of life, is, on the whole, a sombre figure, notwithstanding that he was a man of action. He was a pessimist; he had reason to be one, for with his clear insight he recognized well the state of society in South America. At the last moment, when he was invading Peru, he attempted a peaceful settlement with Spain on the basis of a constitutional monarchy under a Spanish prince. It was too late.

It was the tragic contradiction of his life that he, a character cast in the Spanish tradition, at bottom a medieval type, had to fight against his mother country. But he was a Spaniard and that means an individualist. It is true that the men of the Conquest had been shaped in the same mold. But after them and in spite of them the king moved in with his law and the Church with its spiritual order. Since there was in the Spanish colonies no convincing custom of self-government, and since written constitutions do not command the loyalty of those peoples, there were no forces ready to give the form of law and order to these nations after they had fallen away from Spain. Bolívar well described their state when he said in 1830: "Independence is the only good we have gained, at the cost of all others."¹¹

However, the separation of the Spanish colonies from their mother country was an inevitable development in the nineteenth century; the Spanish American peoples, being what they are, had to achieve it in a manner that expressed their own national character: their struggle for independence was a great epic of which the main heroes were Bolívar and San Martín. It is an heroic epopee that Mitre narrated the story of South American emancipation. From this point of view his satisfaction with this particular piece of history was well justified.

¹⁰He was a deist. See Rojas, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

¹¹ Mitre, *op. cit.*, III, 466.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

MEDIEVAL

A History of Christianity, by Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1953. pp. xxvii, 1516. \$9.50.

As the author himself points out in his preface, the difference between this volume and his extended work on *A History of the Expansion of Christianity*, is that the present single volume attempts a "well-rounded summary of the entire history of Christianity in all its phases and in its setting in the human scene." That is a very large order for a single volume, even a very large one like this. The first half of the book (approximately) is devoted to the history of Christianity up to the religious revolutions of the sixteenth century, and the chapters perforce are, for the most part, a history of the Catholic Church in its origins and in medieval times. The second half of the work takes up the developments of various Protestant groups and churches and continues the story of Catholicism.

The author's viewpoint is that of a mild-mannered American Protestant, and he deals as best he can with the medieval Church. The bibliographies at the end of these sections usually cite some of the best Catholic works on the various topics, although, significantly, the bibliographical note at the end of the pages devoted to the life and doctrine of Christ does not mention the books of Prat, Lebreton, or De Grandmaison. Besides the usual noting that a book is by "a Roman Catholic," other additional notes tell the reader that other books are "by an Anglican bishop" or "by a distinguished Jewish Scholar of the Liberal School," so that the reader may understand that others besides Catholic authors have "viewpoints" in their presentation of history. Though the book does not claim to be more than a summary, there seems to be a notable lack of material on the spread of Catholicism in the lands under the Spanish Empire.

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The Castles of Great Britain, by Sidney Toy. London. Heinemann. 1953. pp. 276. \$5.50.

The author has produced a good reference book about the castles of England. With short chapters on fortifications from "prehistoric times to the Roman Invasion of 43 A.D.", Roman fortifications in Britain including a detailed description of Hadrian's Wall, and Roman-British and Anglo-Saxon forts from 400 to 1066, the book is mainly concerned with English castles from 1066-1500 under such topic-headings as "Norman Castles with Shell Keeps", "Norman Castles with Rectangular Keeps", "Development of Castles from 1160-1270", "Curtain Walls, Gateways and Buildings of the Bailey," "Period of Edward the First" etc.

One difficulty of a book of this type is that it naturally tends to become a "catalogue of ships", and the author would have eased the monotony by more pages devoted to the generalizations which could be made about the various structures and their developments. He does generalize at times and always with profit; there should have been more of it. A glossary would also have helped the reader unfamiliar with the technical terms.

But the book offers definite help to the ordinary teacher of history courses, as well as to the specialist in military history, and by means of some excellent photographs the author has ably supplemented and clarified descriptions in the text.

L. J. Daly, Saint Louis University.

MODERN

Blake: Prophet Against Empire, by David V. Erdman. Princeton. Princeton University Press. 1954. pp. xx, 503. \$7.50.

The visions of prophets and seers, like the systems of the philosophers, in appearance at least, have failed frequently to meet the charge that they remain detached from temporal concerns and the immediate pressure of contemporary events. Arrogantly abstract or sublimely indifferent, they seem to be the work of those to whom history, if regarded at all, is a spectacle rather than an experience. Professor Erdman has shown effectively the complete participation of Blake in the political and social history of his day. Both as commentator and participant, Blake expressed in himself that prophetic vigilance which was the price of his own integrity. In his examination of this outlook, Professor Erdman has unravelled topical allusion to show that his subject was no mere Romantic who recoiled from the implications of the industrial epoch, but a conscientious citizen who saw in the advent of mass warfare at Valmy the complex challenge to oppose the muddleheaded tyranny of state policy and penetrate through political necessity to human need. The tyranny which the prophet confronted is represented as the recurrent, imperialist panacea of the universal state where all become "intermeasurable by one another." Throughout his book, the author manages to present not only Blake's, but a Londoner's view of the period following the Great War for the Empire, the American and French Revolutions, the Napoleonic Wars and England after Waterloo. Constant, detailed, bibliographical reference, in footnotes, to historical sources affords any student of the era every assistance.

In the first part of his survey, the critic is primarily concerned with the impact of the American Revolution and the patriots of London on Blake as a youth. English opposition to the American War is given a perspective which includes a surprisingly wide section of public opinion reflected in the centres of mercantile trade, the London members of the House of Commons, satiric prints and editorials. Here was the beginning of Blake's republicanism and his conception of virtue as the energy to resist arbitrary power and take the way on rather than the way out. The development of a public conscience—so very English in its roots—was specifically related to "Republican art," an expression which he used in a letter to Cumberland during the last year of his life. The phrase does much to clarify Blake's artistic purpose and distinguish it from both Bohemian eccentricity and popular opinion. The prophet who was truly a citizen would neither advise nor submit to arbitrary measures of either prince or proletariat. "Opposition is true Friendship." The later disappointment in the American and French Revolutions only fortified his original conviction that freedom to live could not be purchased by mere freedom *from* kings and princes but by freedom *for* constant revolutionary struggle and search in the arts and

sciences within the sphere of social relations. This was the "Mental Fight", and this was "Republican art" where a line or lineament "is itself, not intermeasurable by anything else." An interesting, but rather terse footnote draws the distinction between Carlyle's attitude toward the French Revolution and that of Blake. The former saw the people rushing into Chaos; the latter placed over against the popular desire for peace the aristocrats' fear of Chaos. Blake was not afraid of the people nor of freedom, while Carlyle was obviously afraid of too much of either. Blake had once written: "Enough! or Too much"—that is, it was impossible to know what was enough until one also knew what was too much. Morbid fear of excess in the name of law and order was the disposition of the slave. History, however, had been a record of the constant action and reaction between the fear-inspired sanctions of peace and the resulting excesses of war. In all this, the individual was the one who consistently lost, partly because his sense of responsibility had been deadened by being constantly told what not to do, and partly because frustration bred social violence which invited the encroachment of state power to "control" it.

In the last part of his book, Professor Erdman endeavours to answer the question which this view of social and political history suggest: did Blake believe that real freedom was possible within the field of human history? Certainly, this question is not easily answered in so many words, for Blake's conception of history included a wider context than the course of terrestrial events, and he had written in his *Vision of the Last Judgment* (1810):

"Many Persons, such as Paine & Voltaire, with some of the Ancient Greeks, say: 'we will not converse concerning Good & Evil; we will live in Paradise Liberty.' You may do so in Spirit, but not in the Mortal Body as you pretend, till after the Last Judgment; for in Paradise they have no Corporeal & Mortal Body—that originated with the Fall & was call'd Death & cannot be removed but by a Last Judgment." [p. 92.]

Blake's conception of "a Last Judgment" involves too much to be discussed here, but the passage serves to cut him clear of any connection with the belief in progress towards some future utopia. Blake was no utopian, yet one is uneasily aware that Professor Erdman is sometimes trying to give him the optimism of a Paine or a Voltaire. Still, he does refer to Blake's doctrine of states but immediately claims that it is possible for the state called "Satan" (the status of a corporeal and natural "selfhood") to "become a null class." This suggestion implies a revolution far deeper than any political or social upheaval—and one which Blake would surely associate with complete redemption from the motivations which make up the natural man. For a book which does not pretend to deal primarily with Blake's theory, this may be unfair criticism, and it is certainly true that, ultimately, Blake saw prophecy and history as one, and that he was never willing "to resign this pleasant world to the Accuser."

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Survey of International Affairs, edited by Peter Calvocoressi. New York. Oxford University Press. 1954. pp. x, 505. \$10.50.

This volume marks the renewal of the postwar annual *Survey of International Affairs*, including a consideration of the Middle East. It is very

valuable as an authoritative survey from a European point of view of the developments, implications, results and presumptive effects of international affairs during a most critical year, 1951. Of special interest is the analysis of "American aid and leadership," and the exposition of European reactions to NATO and the policies of General MacArthur. Russian attitudes and actions are considered and judged to be the chief reasons for any cooperation which did exist among the nations of the free world.

Of course, not everyone will agree with the interpretations of various phases and incidents. For instance, the summary of Archbishop Grösz's trial has an implication that the Archbishop's "plea of guilty" actually represented the objective situation.

The well-done introduction presents a condensed survey and a "working hypothesis for proving the facts of the year." The volume also contains an extensive index and a series of maps, including three of the world (political, population and physical) with an explanatory note by Arnold Toynbee.

Martin F. Hasting, Saint Louis University.

The "Isms": A History and Evaluation, by Eugene O. Golob. New York. Harper and Brothers. 1954. pp. xii, 681. \$6.00.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. It is a study of capitalism, socialism, and corporatism. Such other prominent "isms" as nationalism or liberalism are treated only insofar as they are intimately connected with the subjects of capitalism, socialism, or corporatism. Such an arrangement is valid, of course, because it gives unity and coherence to a study that could go off in all directions if it were really what the title indicated.

Professor Golob devotes the first and smallest section of his book to an analysis of the ideology of capitalism. He relies on the standard authors for this study, men like Smith and Ricardo, and for America on such authors as Hayek and John Bates Clark. The second section (of slightly more than one hundred pages) studies neomercantilism. The third section is devoted to socialism, a good study beginning with the utopian socialists and concluding with Stalinism. The analysis of socialism by revolution in Russia is particularly detailed, with more than two hundred pages devoted to its exposition. The last section, of some two hundred pages, is devoted to theories of corporatism and "an approach to the middle way." In this section both Catholic and Protestant social thought are described, as well as Nazism, Fascism, and the sort of secular social thought that advocates economic organization based on unions and large corporations with a certain measure of governmental control.

Generally speaking, this study is well done. Many general statements have to be made in a work covering so much ground, and it is always possible to find inaccuracies which are a necessary part of such generalizations. For example, one should not speak of the racial element in Fascism (for Fascist doctrine does not have such an element, nor did Fascist action until Hitler demanded it of Mussolini). Nazism is racialist, of course, and a strain of anti-Semitism, at least in practice, is found in some programs that can be considered either corporative or fascist—using either term in the loose sense. But this is not a major objection to Professor Golob's study. It is noted just to point out a danger inherent in such a work.

The author's commitment is to what he considers a middle way that

avoids rigorous systematization. It is a way founded on the Judaeo-Christian tradition as regards man's nature and dignity. "The clarity," he concludes, "with which we understand and apply the values of the Judaeo-Christian tradition that have thus far informed our history will be the measure of the wise choices we make, and the human capacity to err, of the mistaken ones. Even should society become more secular than it is, we are likely to follow that tradition because, divinely revealed to the religious, and manifested to the nonreligious in the history that carries our culture from the known past into the future whose character we must endow, it resides at the core of our ways of living and of thinking." This is an optimistic conclusion, of course, and one can hope that Professor Golob is as good a prophet as he is historian of the economic "isms" he treats in this book.

Thomas P. Neill, Saint Louis University.

French Opinion on War and Diplomacy during the Second Empire, by Lynn M. Case. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1954. pp. xii, 339. \$6.00.

In this monograph Professor Lynn Case has attempted a careful analysis of French opinion of major diplomatic questions during the Second Empire. Realizing the inadequacies of the censored newspapers and magazines of this period as an appropriate reflexion of public thought, Dr. Case has based his account primarily upon the extensive secret reports to the French government from the procureurs general and the prefects, and the diplomatic dispatches of the foreign ambassadors and ministers residing in Paris.

The period Dr. Case has selected for study is important, for it was an age when public opinion was becoming a more significant factor in international politics. Diplomatic crises of the mid-nineteenth century threatened the delicate European balance of power and became matters of concern to every citizen. The growth of constitutionalism and the extension of the suffrage enabled all classes of society to exert greater influence on domestic and foreign policies. In his book the author has not included a discussion of French opinion on the American Civil War or the Mexican Expedition, for other works have treated these topics with sufficient adequacy. He has, however, given very careful consideration to the role of public opinion in the five major military conflicts which occurred during the existence of the Second Empire, namely, the Crimean, Austro-Sardinian, Danish, Austro-Prussian, and Franco-Prussian wars.

From the reading of the text and the examination of the extensive footnotes, it is clear that this study is based on an enormous amount of careful archival research. Unpublished documents from depositories in France, England, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States have been utilized extensively, and the author has not neglected the more readily available published documentary collections and historical studies. He has shown definitely how extensive the French government's arrangements were for searching out public opinion and how effectively this opinion frequently directed the formulation of French foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

Here is a study well-planned, clearly written, and admirably documented. Unmistakably this monograph represents a major contribution to the understanding of the complex era of the Second Empire. The University of

Pennsylvania Press deserves congratulations for presenting this study to the public in a pleasing format and a readable type.

Bernard C. Weber, University of Alabama.

Napoleon and the Awakening of Europe, by F. M. H. Markham. London. The English Universities Press. 1954. pp. viii, 184. \$2.00.

Mr. Markham, Fellow of Hertford College and University Lecturer at Oxford, provides a brief, lively and well-written history of Napoleon which is abreast of recent scholarship. This short biography appears in the recently inaugurated "Teach Yourself History" Series whose aim is to present a great figure in such a way as "to open up a significant historical theme." Here the central problem is the rise of nationalism with special reference to Napoleon's attitude toward national aspirations and the influence of these upon his fall.

The author holds that Napoleon did not play an essential role in the origin of national movements in Europe and that the idea of nationalism was alien to him. For Markham, Napoleon is the last of the Enlightened Despots and constantly violated the principle of nationalism as when he partitioned Venice and annexed Piedmont. Fascinated by the concept of Empire with its echoes of Caesar and Charlemagne, Napoleon's rule by 1810 became the very negation of the idea of nationalism. France was for Napoleon *la Grande Nation*, the center of the civilized world and the nucleus of a universal state.

Markham raises the question of the influence of French revolutionary concepts (particularly the idea of the unity and indivisibility of the nation) upon the opposition to the Napoleonic Empire. In Spain, he argues, their contribution was small and resistance was largely motivated by loyalty to the dynasty and to the Church. Most of Italy, on the other hand, occupied since 1796 by French armies, was profoundly influenced by the ideas and institutions of the Revolution. The Italian middle classes, at least until 1809, had looked to Napoleon to unify their country. However, the mass of illiterate peasantry remained relatively untouched by such aspirations. Except in Austria, nationalism in the Germanies was the monopoly of a small group of intellectuals. According to Markham, it was actually the rulers who organized the resistance; he dismisses the popular character of the War of Liberation as a "romantic legend". Napoleon was defeated, he concludes, not by the spirit of nationality but "by his own over-reaching ambition and by the dynastic rulers who, after repeated and bitter lessons, learned how to combine and to modernize their military effort" (p. 123).

"Napoleon's work was ruined by his pursuit of the impossible dream of world domination beyond the capacity of France and of Napoleon himself." (p. 174). While maintaining that "Napoleon merely exploited the energies and instruments created by the French Revolution", and that "when they were exhausted, he was swept away", he concedes that "without his personality the course of events would have been different." (p. 173) Quite correctly the final chapter is devoted to the years of exile at St. Helena and to the elaboration of the Napoleonic Legend. This was Napoleon's most important contribution to the development of modern European nationalism. Napoleon III and his foreign policy were the direct result of the "campaign of St. Helena."

The book is intended for the general reader and for the college undergraduate. Its objectivity, up-to-date scholarship, and concise and lucid style

make it extremely useful for both. There are a few minor factual errors such as the statement (p. 102) that Pope Pius VII was imprisoned "in Savoy" in 1809.

David L. Dowd, University of Florida.

La Spiritualité de la Compagnie de Jésus, by Joseph de Guibert. Ouvrage Posthume. Roma. Institutum Historicum S. I. 1953. pp. xl, 659.

This was the last work written by the late Father De Guibert, and very probably it will permanently remain the one by which he will be best remembered.

His special competence fitted him to prepare such a study. In this century he seems by all means to have been the Society's leading light in "spiritual theology,"—a phrase that he liked, rather than "ascetical and mystical theology". He was one of the principal founders of the *Revue d'Ascétique et Mystique* at Toulouse in 1925, and for quite a number of years he was its editor. From 1922 on until his death in 1942 he was professor of spiritual theology at the Gregorian University in Rome. He was also one of the foremost spirits in founding and editing the monumental *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité*. This volume, *La Spiritualité . . .*, in giving his bibliography (pp. xiii-xv) lists 74 titles, nearly all of them in his chosen field of ascetical or mystical studies.

In the introduction Fr. De Guibert discusses the sense in which within the limits of Catholic orthodoxy there can be particular schools of spirituality. He argues that in their genesis some eminently successful individual historical spiritual life has been the most important factor; thus Franciscan spirituality goes back to St. Francis himself, Carmelite to Saints Teresa and John of the Cross, and so on. Briefly also he points out what were the most active and influential centers of spiritual force and vitality at the beginning of the sixteenth century when Jesuit spirituality came into being. Such were, for instance, the "New Devotion" in the Low Countries, the Carthusians on the Rhine, the current spiritual movements in Italy and Spain, etc.

The work falls into three great divisions: St. Ignatius himself, the historical development of Jesuit spirituality, and "Some General Aspects."

The first chapter is on the personal interior life of St. Ignatius. In De Guibert's estimation that life and experience were of paramount importance for all that followed. St. Ignatius was a mystic of the highest echelon, but of a type very different from, say, what the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius or St. John of the Cross would suggest. How the saint trained his disciples is the subject-matter of another chapter. Here for the first time the Ignatian ideas of obedience appear. The most thorough-going mortification was insisted upon. A study of Ignatius's writings, both the *Spiritual Exercises* and the *Constitutions of the Society*, is designed to bring out his doctrine as it was set down in black and white. Of the *Exercises* De Guibert says, "The fundamental character of their spirituality is a spirit of active and generous conformity to the will of God" (120). A mark that is very especially characteristic of Ignatius's teaching is the emphasis he places upon the nicest possible adjustment of human means and divine grace.

In a section devoted to the originality of Ignatian spirituality and its debts to the older systems, the *Imitation of Christ* is given first place. However, what is most essential in St. Ignatius's doctrine and most outstanding in its general orientation is due rather to his own intimate life and experi-

ence rather than to anything that he read or heard from others. De Guibert concludes his characterization of Ignatian spirituality in these words: "Service out of love, service that is apostolic and for the greater glory of God, in generous conformity to His will, in total abnegation of all self-love and all personal interest, in the following of Christ, the Chief passionately loved: such seems to be really the essence of the message entrusted to Ignatius by God" (170).

Of the second part, "Historical Development," chapters five and six are especially interesting. After St. Ignatius himself a number of canonized or beatified men, Francis Xavier, Borgia, Canisius, and others contributed in a potent way to forming Jesuit spirituality. With these were associated certain others who enjoyed the Founder's special confidence; *e.g.*, Polanco, Lainez, Nadal. A third group near the beginning were the Society's first spiritual writers. Among these there were noteworthy differences and tendencies. It may surprise many that one of the earliest and most influential of these authors never attained publication: namely, the Spaniard Cordeses (1518-1601). His work as a whole still rests, so to speak, buried in manuscript; some of it is in the British Museum. But his writings were used by Alvarez de Paz (1560-1620), and presumably by others. They were not published because they seemed contrary to the ideas favored by Fr. Mercurian.

As in other matters, so also in the definite formation and consolidation of the Jesuit school of asceticism and mysticism, the generalate of Aquaviva (1581-1615) marked a climax. From then on it was mature, full-grown, relatively fixed and stable. This was the golden age of Luis de Lapuente, Rodriguez, Suarez, Alvarez de Paz, Le Gaudier, etc.

From the time of Aquaviva on down to our own De Guibert endeavors to give an account, not only of the Society's spiritual writers and their doctrines, but also of the interior life of Jesuits as it really has been lived by them in practice, and of the efforts that they have made to sanctify others. Included of course is the story of the spiritual movements and controversies in which they took part; for instance, Jansenism, Quietism, etc.

The third part of this book, "Some General Aspects," is an analytic study of the spirituality of the Society and seeks to bring out the principal characteristics that distinguish it. An effort is made first to indicate exactly the relation between the *Spiritual Exercises* and Jesuit spirituality. They must not be simply equated. Mental prayer, theory and practice, receives a whole chapter. Here certain points that are of controversial interest at present are discussed. In another chapter touchy questions concerning asceticism and Bremond's "*ascétisme*" are handled. Finally, Jesuit spirituality is proposed as *doctrinal*, without being speculative, *practical*, in the sense of aiming at the accomplishment of the divine will, and ideally as culminating in perfect charity proving itself in the *third mode of humility*, complete self-renunciation for Christ.

A concluding section is entitled, "With Christ, to serve!" Fr. De Guibert feels that these words best sum up the fundamental character of Jesuit spirituality.

This is a very excellent work, and one that will surely be indispensable for students, not only of Jesuit asceticism and mysticism, but also of modern Catholic spirituality.

Aug. G. Ellard, St. Mary's College, Kansas.

China in the 16th Century: [his] Journals, 1583-1610, by Matteo Ricci.
Translated by Louis J. Gallagher. Toronto. Random House. 1953. pp. xxii,
616. \$9.00.

Matthew Ricci, S.J., pioneer missionary to China from 1583 to his death in 1610, was a recorder of deeds no less than a doer of them. Few men have ever served so effectively as he to bring two entirely different cultures into contact with each other. He more than deserves the title often bestowed upon him of the "second Marco Polo". Ricci wrote and published for the Chinese in their own language treatises on a wide range of European religious and cultural themes: theology, philosophy, geography, mathematics, applied science, linguistics, music, history, cartography, and numerous other subjects. For Europeans he wrote Chinese history, geography, ethics, religion, customs, and nearly every topic that the awakened interest of the West could suggest; these usually came to the notice of Europeans through the published annual letters from China.

But the most interesting and valuable of all his writings, Ricci made no effort to publish—quite probably gave no thought to doing so. These were his diaries or journals, not a personal record of trifling incidents, but a detailed account of the Chinese Mission in which he had played such a prominent part, and of the people among which it operated.

In recent years two editions of the original Italian text of these diaries has been published with ample notes and commentary: the first, by the veteran historian P. Tacchi Venturi and the second, by the eminent scholar of Chinese culture, P. D'Elia. *China in the 16th Century* is not a translation of either of these editions, but of Nicolas Trigault's 1615 Latin version and adaptation of Ricci's journals. This is the first complete edition in English.

The teacher and student of Chinese history—as well as the general reader—will find in Father Gallagher's clear and idiomatic version a small encyclopedia of China in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. The golden thread that runs through the whole volume is Christianity as it is first grasped by these Orientals. Chinese history is correlated to their political system, their religion, customs, and their way of life. So keen an observer as Ricci saw both the good and the evil in such an ancient culture, and he records his impressions with intelligence and candor. Printing, literature, etiquette, dress, penal system, education, philosophy, all find their ample and sympathetic treatment by one who knew whereof he spoke. The odyssey of the Jesuit Brother, Bento (Benedict) Goes, was the first proof that the Cathay of old was identical with China. A fascinating world awaits the reader of "China in the 16th Century".

E. J. Burrus, Institutum Historicum S.I., Rome.

Cardinal Manning, by Shane Leslie. New York. Kenedy. 1954. pp. 226. \$3.75.

Henry Edward Manning (1806-92), educated and "ordained" as an Anglican, and advanced to be Archdeacon of Chichester, then received into the Church by Wiseman (1851), was destined to become his successor as Archbishop of Westminster (1865). His was such a stormy personality, and his career such a succession of battles, many of them with whole nations as onlookers, to say nothing of his John Bull doggedness in the Vatican Council, that *Lives* of him were being "for" and "against" him even before his death. When the tomb had closed over him, a "biographical debate" set in, which has hardly subsided yet.

In the van of the books attacking him was E. S. Purcell's two-volume *Life* appearing in 1896. Leslie labored long and well to produce a "definitive" work, *Life and Labours of Cardinal Manning* (1921). "Definitive" it may have been—but it shortly went out of print. The Cardinal was one of Strachey's *Eminent Victorians*, and so needed fresh defense. The present work, the author says (viii) is a "careful abstract" of the former one.

The canvas here is so much smaller, and so details are all sharpened, the style condensed, the language glittering—and Manning stands in nobler stature than this reviewer had ever seen him. In particular the Newman-Manning differences find both men in good light. Great is the truth and it will prevail.

By happy coincidence Ellis' work on *Gibbons* recalled Manning's help in the battle for the Knights of Labor, and now Hales' *Pio Nono* (1954) throws further fresh light on these interlocking careers. For all his faults of temperament, the Church of the present day owes much of its high repute for the well-being of the common man to the "churchly intervention" of Cardinal Manning. New in this book is evidence of *Rerum Novarum* depending on an official paper of Manning's.

Gerald Ellard, Saint Mary's College, Kansas.

A Military History of the Western World, From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto, by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. New York. Funk and Wagnalls. 1954. pp. xiii, 602. \$6.00.

Few students of history will have seen before a book like this one. It is not a standard historical survey, because it omits, intentionally, all factors except politics and war. It is, most certainly, not a chapter in the history of the Art of War. This can best be indicated by pointing out that while Zama requires many pages and a map, Cannae gets one paragraph of less than half a page. Shades of Von Schlieffen!

What we have here then is a complete rewriting of the author's work on decisive battles. This was published in 1939-40. The twenty chapters on historic battles in the present work are linked together in an outline of the political history. General Fuller has used a wide range of sources and secondary works which he frequently cites. There is no formal bibliography but there is an unusually good index. This is an excellent book for the general historical reader and it will be useful to many students. It is old-fashioned, solid history, well-written. Some would wish to choose certain battles other than those treated here. In the main, however, the author's choice of battles is made with skill and knowledge and would be difficult to attack.

From the standpoint of "Kriegskunst", however, the author is more vulnerable. He notes the merits and demerits of the *hoplite* and the creation of the *peltast* by Iphicrates. He also remarks upon the "oblique battle order" of Epaminondas and the use of cavalry and reserves by Alexander. He discusses the nature of the legionary army and its training and armament as well as the importance of the *corvus* in naval warfare. But, General Fuller is on dubious ground, in my opinion, in his discussion of the use of cavalry in antiquity. He regards the persistence of the infantry army as a mark of the closed military mind. But he neglects to note that, until Adrianople, when they learned to use them from the Sarmatians, the Greeks and Romans had no stirrups. Ancient cavalry, without stirrups, was

not invincible, or even effective against massed heavy-armed infantry. Not even Alexander, in my opinion, would have charged his column of cavalry against a well-led phalanx of Greek hoplites.

One other point. Nowhere does he tell how the Roman foot soldier, the swordsman *par excellence* of antiquity, successfully overcame, not only the Greek phalanx but cavalry as well. How handle the tremendous length of line when deploying a legion, and was the quincunx really used in battle? Again, nowhere does he set forth what a tremendous job it was in those days to take a well-walled town. Why was Cannae not decisive as Zama was? One reason lies in the fact that Hannibal could not take the city of Rome. The other in the rock-like character of the Roman Confederation.

But, this is a good book and a very useful one and there is no stronger chapter in it than the final one on the Battle of Lepanto.

Thomas A. Brady, University of Missouri.

AMERICAN

The Churches and the Schools, by Francis X. Curran. Chicago. Loyola University Press. 1954. pp. vii, 152. \$3.00.

This is the first volume in a new series to be published under the title of Jesuit Studies by Loyola University Press. The first, and most obvious criticism of the book is that there is no explanation of the series in the first volume. The term Jesuit Studies has already been used as the title of another series, dealing with the history of the Jesuits in the Southwest. The brief statement that is contained on the introductory leaf that "Jesuit Studies [are] Contributions to the arts and sciences by members of the Society of Jesus" is quite insufficient. The book itself deals with the problem of the Protestant schools, particularly on the elementary level, and is closely connected with Father Curran's earlier work on major trends in the Protestant churches in the United States.

E. R. Vollmar, Saint Louis University.

George Mercer Papers, edited and compiled by Lois Mulkearn. Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press. 1954. pp. xxxviii, 731. \$10.00.

The *George Mercer Papers* may be too limited in scope to have a universal appeal, but assuredly they will be of importance to anyone who is interested in the Late Colonial period, in western expansion, in land speculation, and in Indian affairs.

These *Papers* are the official documents of the Ohio Company of Virginia. They bear the title that they do because they are the records that were in the possession of George Mercer, the third and last agent who represented the Company in London in the years following the close of the French and Indian War. He was attempting to induce the Privy Council to renew and modify an earlier land grant to the Company.

The partners who formed the Ohio Company in 1747 were ambitious. They reported as their design the "taking up a large tract of 500,000 Acres of Land on the branches of Allagany and settling a Trade with the several nations of Indians." Three years later, their scout, Christopher Gist, was instructed to search out lands "as low as the great Falls" on the Ohio River (present Louisville, Kentucky).

Included in this collection are the Gist Journals, the records that this Maryland-born surveyor kept during his reconnaissance on the frontier from 1750 to 1752. This is splendid! Anything that will make the deserving Gist a better known figure to American readers is desirable. His notes are often inclined to be brief, but they reveal the hardships, the loneliness, and sometimes the coarseness of life in the wilderness. Happily, Gist was not brutalized by this environment, and to the end of his life was a man of good character. One Christmas this woodsman conducted a simple religious service for the Indians who were so impressed by the man that they urged him to reside among them permanently as a minister and instructor.

The Ohio Company differed from some land speculating companies in that it was interested in making actual settlements on the frontier. Early in its history it planned to settle at least 150 families on its property. Settlers who went west within two years were offered one hundred acres "for every person not exceeding four in Family, and 50 Acres for every one exceeding four."

Despite its hopes and its planning, the Ohio Company was destined to failure. The story of its lack of success is difficult to summarize. The French and Indian War was the first situation to block the contemplated advance into the West. Then English military and civil proclamations curbed settlement. And ultimately the entire project exploded when the American Revolution began.

Even those who are least interested in the subject matter of these documents will be impressed by the gigantic job of editing that was required before *George Mercer Papers* could be made serviceable for the student. From the quantitative approach alone, Mrs. Mulkearn's product is prodigious. The book includes 818 different notes—some of one line, some running to several pages each. These excellent notes comprise 214 pages of this book. In addition, add 166 pages of illuminating commentary, 27 pages of bibliography, and a very detailed index.

A documentary collection of this type might lose value unless the stage were "set" and clarifying background provided for the reader. This is effectively done in a Foreword by Dr. R. W. G. Vail of the New York Historical Society and in a well written introduction by the editor herself.

Richard L. Beyer, Gannon College.

Epic of the Overland, by Robert L. Fulton. Los Angeles. N. A. Kovach. 1954. pp. xii, 109. \$5.00.

This book is a reissue, or reprint of an eyewitness account of the building of the Central and Union Pacific railroad which was printed privately and published for the author in 1924. The untimely death of both author and publisher curtailed the distribution of the book and relatively few copies were circulated. All students of railroad history are indebted to N. A. Kovach for making this little gem of first hand account available. The story is brief, but well illustrated. Like so many accounts written after such a long lapse of time it is lacking in detail, but interesting in anecdote. It helps to the understanding of the problems faced by the man in the field, and completes the picture of the opening of the West.

E. R. Vollmar, Saint Louis University.

Mine Eyes Have Seen the Glory, by L. Minor Blackford. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1954. pp. xix, 293. \$5.00.

This is the story of a remarkable Southern family, or, rather, of the *matrix* of that family, Mary Berkeley Minor Blackford, told through the interweaving of selections from diaries and letters (of the family and others, such as the accounts of life in Liberia by former slaves). The dominant figure is Mary Blackford, ardent and determined advocate of social reforms, especially the abolition of slavery and the promotion of prohibition (of strong drink, as she was fond enough of home-brewed ginger beer).

The most intriguing and valuable contributions of the Blackford record are the insights given to the thoughts both of that portion of the Southern gentry not in sympathy with slavery and of the bondsmen. There is about the narrative a natural tone which adds to its authentic note.

There are many interesting sidelights (for instance Mrs. Blackford's prophecy that the Confederacy could not last), many touching vignettes (such as Mrs. Blackford's picture of the parade of one-time slave children commemorating the first anniversary of the establishment of public schools), and many dramatic scenes (as that of the former slave M'am Peggy resolutely refusing consent to be buried "at nobody's feets.")

A fine introduction by Bell I. Wiley, photographs, genealogical chart, notes and index add to the volume's worth.

Martin F. Hasting, Saint Louis University.

A City Parish Grows and Changes, by Sister M. Martina Abbott, S. C. Washington. Catholic University of America. 1953. pp. vii-87. \$3.00.

This is an interesting study of the factors that have affected the life of a large parish, St. John the Baptist, in Pittsburgh. Established in 1878 when the flood of Irish immigrants into the sixth ward was at its height, St. John's has seen its own natural territory divided twice; once for a "cultural island" of German immigrants and again for the Polish. By these divisions three-fifths of the original territory was lost to St. John's and two-thirds of the 'designated' Catholic population. One might well have expected that an industrial center, a haven for immigrants, would grow rapidly. That the first pastors of St. John's anticipated to an extent what was actually happening as changes in land use, expansion of railroads and industries occurred, was providential. But in the last century, and particularly in the era of national parishes, pastors were near to their flocks in every respect and a parish was the center not only of the religious life of the parishioners but of their culture and social life as well. Of one pastor, Father McKeever, Sister Martina says, ". . . he saw what was happening at the time in which he was living." Another observation that strikes one is the zeal with which these pioneer Catholics never failed to build parochial schools simultaneously with new parishes. The effects are apparent today. In fact the building of a new parish "soon caused every available residential space to be filled up." In this country where the Church functions within a complex urban society it is important to know and to be able to anticipate the rapid changes, much different from a generation ago, that are occurring today.

A. H. Scheller, Saint Louis University.

Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief, by Joseph T. Durkin, S.J.
Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press. 1954. pp. xi, 446.
\$6.00.

Stephen R. Mallory was a key figure in Jefferson Davis' cabinet. In the crucial ante-bellum years he represented Florida in the United States Senate and chaired the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs. After the Civil War and nine months of imprisonment at Fort Lafayette, New York, he returned to Florida where he took a prominent part in the attack by Southern Democrats on Radical Reconstruction.

Mallory's entire public career is examined by Father Durkin. In addition; the warmth and pathos of his family life are clearly pictured. Mallory's views on subjects such as secession, reconstruction, naval warfare, and States' rights are especially interesting, but the author also gives us an excellent account of the Confederate Naval Secretary's opinions on social and religious matters by liberal references to his subject's diary and his personal letters. This book represents a judicious weaving of personal, official, social, religious and political factors in the life of one man. It is an attempt to explain to the reader the inner and the outer history of Mr. Mallory.

The most significant section of the book is that dealing with the Civil War; chapters dealing with the war constitute over half of the book. Father Durkin here gives us as much insight into the difficulties of the Confederate Navy and the Confederate Government as he does into the problems of Stephen R. Mallory. He makes especially clear the way in which the States' rights position of the South came back to plague her during the war when united effort was absolutely necessary. Mallory's friendship with President Davis and Secretary Benjamin is related, and one receives the implication that Mallory must have been a capable man to be on fairly intimate terms with these men. The account, through the eyes of a cabinet member, of the last days of the Confederate government and the flight of the cabinet from Richmond south into Georgia gives one a real sense of participation with these officials in their time of trouble. The only thing this reviewer misses in the story of the Confederate Navy is a detailed analysis of naval activities and construction centered in England, together with Mallory's part in this phase of the war operations.

This is the first published biography of Mallory. It is clear that the author, Professor of History at Georgetown University, has done a tremendous amount of digging to get sufficient materials for such a work. Where the book is spotty it is obvious that the materials are simply lacking. The book is extremely well documented; in fact, there appears to be sufficient material in the footnotes, of a "sidelight" nature, to write another small book. An eighteen page critical bibliography gives credence to the author's prefatory statement: "He is confident that he has at least found all the important Mallory sources that are or will be in the future available".

Mallory was one of the two men who retained his post in the cabinet during the entire war, yet Father Durkin eschews overemphasis of his role and adopts a refreshingly moderate tone throughout. His sympathies are clearly with the man and his family, but they do not get in the way of his presenting a balanced picture.

This biography brings new appreciation for the problems of the South in the middle decades of the nineteenth century.

Marvin Wachman, Colgate University.

The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison, by Stuart Gerry Brown. Syracuse. Syracuse University Press. 1954. pp. x, 186. \$3.00.

Professor Brown in this brief volume attempts to isolate the key ideas of the first Republicans in the generation after 1775 and to relate those ideas to the program and policies of the early Republican party. His purpose is to show how these men, particularly Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, George Mason, Thomas Paine, and Albert Gallatin, took the ideas of natural rights and "built [them] into a system of free government and a free way of life."

The theme is developed in six chapters, which discuss respectively the Republican view of natural rights, their attitude toward the Constitution, their domestic and foreign policies, their opinions on religious freedom and the separation of church and state, and the author's conclusions.

Professor Brown considers the major contributions of the Republicans to the natural-rights philosophy to be the avoidance of the extremes represented by Hobbes and Rousseau, the emphasis placed upon Jefferson's thesis that "the earth belongs to the living," and the systematization of their views into a consistent philosophy and program of government. In discussing the Constitution, he takes great pains to demonstrate that the Republicans were not anti-nationalist; they were "libertarians first, nationalists second, but nationalists none the less." He decries particularly the opinion that early Republican ideas can justifiably be used as the basis for later extreme positions on states' rights and argues that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions are "the first great American fight for civil liberties." His discussions of the domestic and foreign policies of the Republicans attempt to show the consistency of these policies with the fundamental principles of the Republican philosophy. The chapter on "Religion and the State" traces the work of Jefferson and Madison in furthering religious freedom and points out that the Republicans believed that religion was one of man's natural rights completely exempt from the control of government. The concluding chapter analyzes the Republican conception of education and its relation to the objective of selecting the officers of government from a "natural aristocracy" of virtue and talents. The author sums up the Republican philosophy as "a series of variations on the theme of freedom," but he adds that the "First Republicans" looked beyond freedom, which was to be only the necessary condition under which men might prepare a good life.

Professor Brown's study definitely stresses the positive side of the early Republican philosophy, and he candidly admits his sympathies with it. Other writers using the same materials might easily arrive at quite different conclusions. The Federalists certainly receive less appreciative treatment than they probably merit, although the author does not adopt a denunciatory attitude towards them. Historians will also be inclined to doubt that Republicans as a party were quite as consistent in cleaving to their principles as this book would show them to be. With these qualifications in mind, it can be said that Professor Brown has presented us with a stimulating and rewarding analysis of the principles underlying our American political faith. A renewal of our acquaintance with them is an enjoyable and heartening experience.

Sanford W. Higginbotham, University of Mississippi.

Fifty Million Acres: Conflicts over Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890, by Paul Wallace Gates. Ithaca, New York. Cornell University Press. 1954. pp. 311. \$4.50.

The American system of land distribution before 1854 sought to provide easy means to ownership for emigrants willing to undergo the hardships of pioneer life. Settlers were able to buy at low prices, enter and select public land before speculative monopolists could—and even to reside for a year before starting to pay for the tract. There was also provision for school lands, for canals, river improvements and railroads, all desirable necessities on the frontier.

But the Buchanan and Pierce administrations upset this well-functioning program, under the pressure of southern conservatives and land-jobbing speculators. Thereupon followed an era of extortionate interest in the whole West. Dr. Gates selects Kansas as adequately representative for his study.

In Kansas, 18 Indian reserves were opened to homesteading and pre-emption but became the “booty of speculators, land companies, and railroads, with substantial benefits accruing to helpful politicians.”

All these abuses had some good (but unlooked for) results: they inspired reformers and agrarianists, conservationists and sponsors of railroad taxation and regulation.

“It brought local issues to national attention,” says Dr. Gates, “produced leaders for the national land-reform movement and brought about an abolition of the treaty method of land disposal.” On the local level, his nineteen years of research prove that speculator intrusion has generally bad results. One can conclude that in their scramble for land profits the railroads actually hampered developmental processes of the new regions.

These were days when the House, whose members were amenable to the “blackmail” of lobbyists and railroad tycoons, could still grow righteously angry at the “gross and fraudulent” neglect of the Osage Indians by the Indian Office.

The book abounds in documentation from local records and state and private collections. Its focus on fraud and shortsightedness could be of some pertinence in current discussion of public lands in the West, Indian properties, and development of water resources.

Raymond Bernard, Institute of Social Order, Saint Louis University.

CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHY

This bibliography is intended to be of service to teachers and students of history by presenting a fairly complete list of historical works announced or published since the previous issue of *The Historical Bulletin*. Many of these books will be reviewed in this or a later issue. Unfortunately sometimes the price and number of pages were not obtainable.

MEDIEVAL

- Bolger, R. R., *The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries*. Cambridge Univ. pp. 598. \$8.50.
 Crawford, V. E., *Sumerian Economic Texts from the First Dynasty of Isin*. Yale. pp. 168. \$8.00.
 Cook, G. H., *The English Medieval Parish Church*. Macmillan. \$7.50.
 Dodwell, C. R., *The Canterbury School of Illumination*. Cambridge Univ. pp. 154. \$15.00.
 Ehler, S. Z., and J. B. Morrall, *Church and State Through the Centuries*. Newman. pp. 639. \$6.75.
 Frye, R. N., *The History of Bukhara*. Med. Acad. of Amer. pp. 198. \$5.00.
 Grunebaum, G. E. von, *Studies in Islamic Cultural History*. Amer. Anthropological Assn. pp. 71. paper, apply.
 Hughes, R., *Music Lovers' Encyclopedia*. Garden City. pp. 922. \$3.50.
 Lewis, E., *Medieval Political Ideas*. Knopf. 2v. \$12.50.
 Lot, F., *The End of the Ancient World and the Beginnings of the Middle Ages*. Barnes and Noble. pp. 480. \$7.50.

The timely reprint of this standard monograph upon one of the interesting periods of history helps furnish collateral reading for the multitude of college classes in "Survey History" courses. With French clarity the author analyzes the various causes, occasions, and circumstances that went into the remaking of the ancient world. His main thesis is that the new world began in the eighth and not the fourth century, and owed its existence to the forces unleashed by Mohammed, the thing we call Feudalism, and to the successors of St. Peter.

- Malin, J. C. *On the Nature of History*. J. C. Malin, Lawrence, Kans. pp. 300. \$3.00.
 Maynard, T., *St. Benedict*. Kenedy. pp. 255. \$3.00.
 Nicholson, R. L., *Jocelyn I, Prince of Edessa*. Univ. of Ill. pp. 117. \$3.50.
 Powicke, F. M., *The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307*. Oxford. pp. 843. \$8.00.
 Stewart, C., *Early Christian and Romanesque Architecture*. Longmans. pp. 302. \$5.75.
 Strayer, J. R., *Europe in the Middle Ages*. Appleton-Century-Crofts. pp. 245. \$2.50.

This book is an attempt to give, in the briefest space possible, an interpretation of the rise and fall, the nature and contributions, of medieval civilization.

- Thompson, F., *A Short History of Parliament*. Univ. of Minn. pp. 290. \$4.50.

One of the most important contributions of medieval civilization has been parliament. The obscurity of its origins may puzzle or intrigue

historians, but it cannot minimize the importance of the institution. Successive centuries have but increased our respect (at least those of us who live in the Free World) for representative government. This well-written work tells the story of the English parliament in three stages of its development: the Late Middle Ages, The Tudor Period, and the Early Stuart Period. Each division is made up of a sketch of the era, a brief account of the developments as regards the members, organization, powers, and procedures of parliament together with biographical notes on some of the members, and a vivid account of an actual session of parliament at that period.

The first Section of the Work (Late Medieval Period) is especially helpful to teachers, while the Tudor section is the weakest. Overmuch reliance on Pollard's polemical work rather than that of men like Prof. Keir has definitely dated it. In an interesting footnote to p. 139 the author quotes "an extremely hostile" view of Henry VIII from "a Catholic biographer" (R. W. Chambers). He was not a Catholic biographer of Henry VIII. As a whole the book offers a short vivid history of parliament, but the medieval section appears the most helpful and historical.

MODERN

Beresford, M., *The Lost Villages of England*. Phil. Lib. pp. 445. \$12.00.

Among the existing villages in the English countryside are the sites of many others which have not been fortunate enough to survive, though six hundred years ago they were little different from their neighbors. This book locates these lost villages and describes the occasion of their depopulation.

Cady, J. F., *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia*. Cornell Univ. pp. 334. \$5.00.

Carus-Wilson, E. M., *Essays in Economic History*. St. Martin's. pp. 446. \$10.00.

Cressey, G. B., *How Strong Is Russia—A Geographical Appraisal*. Syracuse Univ. pp. 146. \$3.00.

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Jones, G. H., *The Main Stream of Jacobitism*. Harvard. pp. 285. \$4.50.

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AMERICAN

- Ahern, P. H., *The Life of John J. Keane*. Bruce. pp. 396. \$6.50.
 A well documented life of the fifth Bishop of Richmond, first Archbishop of Dubuque, and founder and first rector of the Catholic University of America.
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